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FRAUD ON THE MARKET: A CRITICISM OF
DISPENSING WITH RELIANCE
REQUIREMENTS IN CERTAIN OPEN
MARKET TRANSACTIONS
BARBARA BLACKt
The still-developing fraud on the market theory is the primary
method by which securities fraud plaintiffs have attempted either to re-
lax or eliminate the troubling reliance and causation requirements.
Professor Black examines this emerging theory and suggests that the
traditional common-lawfraud concepts that focus on reliance and cau-
sation still have validity and continue, even in this context, to offer ap-
propriate limitations on liability. The Article analyzes cases that have
reduced or ignored this reliance element and explains why the legal con-
cepts from which the fraud on the market theory evolved demand
stricter adherence to reliance in certain markets but not in others. Pro-
fessor Black incorporates the efficient market theory into her analysis
by suggesting it as a condition which the courts should consider when
determining the degree to which they will demand proof of causation
and reliance in a securities fraud case.
In securities fraud litigation under rule lOb-5,1 it has become popular to
invoke a theory of "fraud on the market" in order to relax, or even eliminate,
the traditional tort law element of reliance. This is accomplished by empha-
sizing the other traditional elements of materiality and causation.2 The para-
" Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1970, Barnard College; J.D. 1973,
Columbia. The author gratefully acknowledges the research and editorial assistance of Laura D.
Barbieri, Class of 1984, Pace University School of Law.
I. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1942
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982),
provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946), federal courts have consistently implied a private cause of action under rule lOb-
5. The Supreme Court first acknowledged the existence of a private claim in Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
2. The traditional elements of deceit at common law, from which a rule lOb-5 claim is
derived, are as follows: (1) Misrepresentation of a material fact, (2) reliance, (3) causation, and (4)
scienter. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-530 (1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW or TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). See generally 3 L. Loss, SEcuRmIEs REGULA-
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digm of a fraud on the market litigation is a class action brought by purchasers
TION 1430-44 (2d ed. 1961) (discussion relating the common law deceit elements to the "fraud"
concepts in securities regulation).
Mater'ality. A fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that the reasonable investor
would consider it important in making an investment decision. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Although TSC articulated the standard for materiality in cases
brought under rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983), courts have uni-
formly applied this standard in rule lOb-5 cases. E.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 49 (Ist
Cir. 1983); Simpson v Southeastern Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1983); Harmsen v.
Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 946 n.Il (9th Cir. 1982); Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 709 (7th Cir. 1982);
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 176 (8th Cir. 1982); Elkind v. Ligget & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d
156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980).
Reliance. Reliance involves subjectively determining whether a particular investor consid-
ered the misrepresentation a substantial factor in making his investment decision. List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). In cases involving omis-
sions, the test is met if the investor would have been influenced to act differently than he did had
defendant disclosed to him the undisclosed fact. Id. at 463. Courts have required that the reliance
be reasonable in affirmative misrepresentation cases, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 695
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977), or that the investor exercise "due diligence" in
making his decision, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White contended that the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to clarify the standard of care with regard to "due diligence.").
Causation. Causation involves a determination that the harm suffered by the investor
"flowed" from the misstatement. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). Traditionally, causation requires a finding that
the misrepresented fact was a proximate cause of the investor's loss; thus, the misrepresentation
must touch upon the reasons for the stock's decline in value. "Absent the requirement of causa-
tion, Rule lob-5 would become an insurance plan for the cost of every security purchased in
reliance upon a material misstatement or omission." Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir.),rehearing denied,modred on other grounds, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981),
a ff'dinpart, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983). The Second Circuit, on the other
hand, takes a more relaxed view of proximate cause, permitting recovery upon a showing that the
economic loss was a foreseeable consequence of the misrepresentation and not necessarily upon a
showing that the loss resulted from the misrepresentation's effect on the true value of the security.
E.g, Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708-10 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 449 U.S.
1011 (1980).
Many courts use the terms "transaction causation" and "loss causation" instead of reliance
and causation respectively. E.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975). This author agrees with Judge Frankel, in Schlick,
507 F.2d at 384 (Frankel, J., concurring), that the use of these terms does not aid analysis in this
area and instead contributes to the confusion between these terms and the requisite elements of
reliance and causation in rule lOb-5 cases. Therefore, this Article's analysis of causation deliber-
ately avoids these terms. For a contrary view, see Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule
10b-5, 9 SEc. REG. LJ. 99,100 (1981) (advocating the use of these terms in analysis of rule lob-5
claims).
Scienter. Scienter is a required element in a rule lob-5 action. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). Circuit courts have included reckless conduct within the definition of
scienter. See, eg., McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332,
1336-38 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Roif v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); First Va. Bankshares v.
Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Sun Chem Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). The
Supreme Court has expressly left this issue open, Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 103 S. Ct.
683, 685 n.4 (1983).
Privily. While at common law there is no absolute requirement of privity, and thus third
parties may be liable in a deceit action, plaintiff must nevertheless be "one to whom, or to influ-
ence whom, the third party made the misrepresentation." 3 L. Loss, supra, at 1628; see also
Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231 (1966). The insider trading
cases, in which plaintiffs complain of injury because they were trading in the marketplace during a
time when others were trading on the basis of undisclosed information, provide most of the judi-
cial examination of the privity requirement under rule lOb-5. Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
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of stock alleging that over a period of time the stock prices were artificially
inflated due to material misstatements contained in publicly available corpo-
rate documents.3 The recent rash of corporate scandals involving allegations
of "cooked books" and other efforts by corporate management to improve the
firm's apparent profitability4 certainly will give rise to many more fraud on the
market suits.
The fraud on the market theory has not fully developed, and few deci-
sions have extensively analyzed it.5 Its development is traceable principally to
two factors. First, courts have sought to streamline securities fraud litigation
to make it an appropriate vehicle for class actions.6 Thus, individual issues of
proof, such as reliance, which would make an action inappropriate for class
action certification, are minimized. Second, in recent years there has been in-
creased judicial, administrative, and scholarly recognition of the "efficient
market" thesis, 7 which states that in free and actively traded markets, stock
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974) ('[P]rivity between plaintiffs and
defendants is not a requisite element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action for damages.") with Fridrich
v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976) (because defendants' trading in no way influ-
enced plaintiffs' trading decision, "defendants' act of trading with third persons was not causally
connected with any claimed loss by plaintiffs, who traded on the impersonal market. ... ), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
3. E.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976),
discussed infra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
4. In recent months, the SEC frequently has expressed its concern over the practice of
"cooked books," that is, management inflating sales and earnings figures in order to satisfy their
superiors' desire for increased profitability. Eg., Treadway says Pressure to meet Goals may cause
Executives to "Cook Books,' SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 421 (Mar. 4, 1983); SEC v. McCormick &
Co., Inc., SEC. REG. & L. RaP. (BNA) 21 (D.D.C. Dec. 21, 1982) (defendants consented to a
permanent injunction without admitting or denying SEC's allegations); Wall St. J., July 5, 1983, at
1, col. 6 (Nucorp Energy executive accused of cooking the books); Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 2,
col. 2 (executives of foreign subsidiary of Pepsico manipulated earnings figures).
5. The Supreme Court has yet to consider the fraud on the market theory. Several circuit
courts have accepted it in varying degrees. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated as moot sub nom Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d
891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 0976). For commentator's views, see generally Fis-
chel, Use of Modern Finance Theory In Securities Fraud Cases InvolvingActively Traded Securities,
38 Bus. LAw. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fishel, Use of Modern Finance Theory]; Rapp, Rule 10b-
5 and Fraud-on-the-Market-Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shores, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 861
(1982); Note, Fraud on the Market: An Emerging Theory of Recovery Under SEC Rule lob-5, 50
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1143
(1982).
6. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
7. Decisions that have relied on the efficient market thesis include Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Tiger Int'l Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361-62 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F.
Supp. 1127, 1131 n.6 (D. Del. 1982); Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F.
Supp. 1234, 1238 (D. Utah 1982); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143-45 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
The SEC recognized the efficient market thesis in developing its integrated disclosure system.
Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383,47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 13,382, 13,384-85 (adoption of form S-3 to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 239.13); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,903-04 (proposed); Sec. Act
Rel. No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,694-96 (proposed). For a discussion of integrated disclo-
sure, see infra notes 216-37 and accompanying text.
Professor Daniel R. Fischel is the leading legal scholar advocating the use of the efficient
market thesis in analyzing corporate and securities law issues. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel,
The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L.REv. 1161
(1981); Fisehel, Use of Modern Finance, supra note 5, at 1; Fischel, The Law and Economics of
DividendPolicy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fischel, The Law] ; Fischel, Effi-
1984]
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prices will fully reflect all available information about the corporation.8 Influ-
enced by this theory, some courts view as outdated the traditional notion that
the investor must read the documents containing the misstatement in order to
be misled.9
This Article traces the development of the fraud on the market theory and
analyzes the leading cases in the area. It examines objections to the fraud on
the market theory and discusses problems in harmonizing the theory with ex-
plicit causes of action under the federal securities laws. Finally it explores the
Security and Exchange Commission's recognition of the efficient market thesis
in developing the integrated disclosure system, and its application to the fraud
on the market theory.
Fraud on the market cases can be interpreted in two ways. Under one
interpretation, plaintiffs burden of establishing direct reliance is eased by ac-
cording him a presumption of indirect reliance upon showing a material mis-
statement; reliance, in this weakened form, remains an element in rule lOb-5
cases. Under another interpretation, the reliance element is eliminated; the
court is concerned only with ascertaining whether the violation caused plain-
tiff injury. Under this approach, a case involving a material misstatement be-
comes a case of stock manipulation.
This Article concludes that the latter "pure causation" theory, while
cdent Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fisehel, Efficient Capital]. See also H.
KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 83-88,
96-107 (1979) (criticizing the SEC for not incorporating the efficient market thesis in its disclosure
regulations); Pickhol & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market Theory and its InFact
on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (1982); Note, The Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 1031 (1977).
8. Adherents of the efficient market thesis contend that the principal tool of securities ana-
lysts in predicting future stock prices--the use of fundamental or intrinsic value analysis to find
undervalued or overvalued stocks-is useless, at least for the average analyst and average inves-
tor. This is so because the market has already taken into account expected events in currently
pricing the stock. Accordingly, the current stock price is the best estimate of the stock's intrinsic
value, and future price movements will be random. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55, excerpted in ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND
SECURITIES REGULATION 156, 157-62 (R. Posner & K. Scott eds. 1980).
Three forms of the efficient market thesis are generally recognized as weak, semistrong, and
strong. Weak form efficient market theorists assert that past price trends in stock prices convey no
information about future trends. Generally, everyone except the chartists accepts the weak form.
The theory in its semistrong form is that an investor cannot analyze the publicly available infor-
mation about a corporation to outpredict the market concerning its future performance. The theo-
rists advocating the strong form contend that even those investors with access to information not
generally available cannot outperform the market.
Not surprisingly, many market professionals dispute the validity of the efficient market thesis
except in the weak form. See, e.g., Bernstein, In Defense of Fundamental Investment Analysis,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 57. Moreover, it is frequently observed that the thesis only
works so long as securities analysts disbelieve it; it is their efforts to outperform the market that
result in the market's efficiency. E.g., J. LovaE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES
AND EVIDENCE 98 (1973).
For background on the efficient market thesis, see E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 133-
68 (1976); J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra, at 70-110; Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets." A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
9. See, e.g., In re Ramada Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1130-31 (D. Del. 1982); In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 142-45 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
[Vol. 62
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seemingly attractive as a principle of law and logic, marks too radical a depar-
ture from rule lOb-5's common-law origins in deceit. On the other hand, af-
fording plaintiff a presumption of indirect reliance is appropriate whenever
there is a basis for determining that the stock is traded in an efficient market.
The courts should incorporate the SEC's work on the integrated disclosure
system to determine whether the market is efficient for the stock in issue and
thus whether affording plaintiff a presumption of indirect reliance is appropri-
ate. When the market is not efficient, plaintiff should bear the burden of es-
tablishing reliance. In some instances plaintiff may meet this burden by
demonstrating indirect reliance, such as consulting a broker or reading an in-
vestment column. In other instances, when the securities are speculative in
nature, plaintiff should be required to show direct reliance: that he actually
read the disclosure document.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
In rule 1Ob-5 cases, courts initially required plaintiffs to establish, in addi-
tion to materiality, both reliance' ° and causation." These requirements were
unquestionably appropriate and not particularly burdensome when the viola-
tion resembled the common-law tort of deceit, as when an individual sued on
the basis of misrepresentations made to him in direct negotiations.12 The deci-
sion of the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. ,13 however, ex-
panded the rule lOb-5 remedy to include misstatements 14 contained in
publicly available documents. Thus, the rule lOb-5 claim was no longer di-
rectly analogous to the common-law tort.15
Class actions, in particular, exemplified the problems resulting from
plaintifi's required showing of reliance and causation. The amendment of rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 intended to expand the availa-
10. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962), aj#'d, 319 F.2d
634 (7th Cir. 1963). See also List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.) (the proper test
for reliance is "whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act
if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
11. E.g., Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978). Cf Marbury Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 708 (2d. Cir.) (although the misrepresentation did not go to the
intrinsic value of the securities, it induced plaintiff to purchase and retain the stock; thus, the
misrepresentation caused the transaction and the loss therefrom), cert. denied sub nona Wood
Walker & Co. v. Marbury Management, Inc., 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
12. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. deniedsub non. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
14. To eliminate the need to use the cumbersome phrase "misrepresentations and omissions,"
the author uses "misstatements" to include both misrepresentations and omissions when there is
no need to distinguish between the two. The phrases "misrepresentations" and "omissions" are
used whenever precise usage is required.
15. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1983).
16. The 1966 amendments to rule 23 reject categorization of class actions in terms of the
abstract nature of the rights involved and instead provide more practical, functional classifica-
tions. For an action to be maintained as a class action, it must meet the prerequisites of rule 23(a):
numerosity, common questions of law or fact, typicality of claims, and fair and adequate protec-
tion of the interests of the class, and, in addition, one of the three subdivisions of rule 23(b). A
securities fraud class action generally attempts to meet the requirements of rule 23(b)(3): "that the
1984]
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bility of class actions, prompted many courts to view the class action as an
appropriate vehicle for adjudicating the liability of defendants whose misstate-
ments affected many open market investors.17 Unless a class action could be
maintained, investors with small losses effectively would be precluded from
redressing their injuries.' 8 Since class action status under paragraph (b)(3) of
rule 23 depends on a "predominance of common issues," defendants at-
tempted to defeat class action certification by asserting that each plaintiff must
show individual reliance on the misstatements to establish a rule lOb-5
claim. 19 While some courts held that the requirement of individual reliance
made the class action inappropriate for rule lOb-5 claims, 20 others, unwilling
to destroy the utility of the class action suit in securities fraud litigation, sought
to relax or even eliminate the reliance requirement. 21
The court in Green v. Wolf Corp. 22 proposed separate or bifurcated trials
questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." The amendments also greatly increase
judicial power and discretion to manage and supervise class actions.
17. See Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94,
101 (10th Cir. 1968) ("[Alny error [in class certification], if there is to be made one, should be
committed in favor of allowing the class action"), cer. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). Prior to the
revision of rule 23, Professor Loss observed that "[t]he ultimate effectiveness of the federal reme-
dies... may depend in large measure on the applicability of the class action device." 3 L. Loss,
supra note 2, at 1819.
18. See Kom v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Memorex Sec.
Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 98-99 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (quoting Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d
731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom Drexel & Co. v. Hall, 382 U.S. 816 (1966)).
19. The Advisory Committee on rule 23 left unresolved whether a fraud action was appropri-
ate for class action status:
The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class action may be
maintained under this subdivision, that the questions common to the class predominate
over the questions affecting individual members. . . . [A] fraud perpetrated on numer-
ous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a
class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate
determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class. On the other
hand, although having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment
as a class action if there was material variation in the representation made or in the kinds
or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee note.
20. E.g., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.RID. 306, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Reynolds
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566, 567-69 (D. Utah 1970) (Reynolds II), afjdsub nom.
Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
In Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970) (Reynolds I) the
trial court specifically found that each of the three plaintiffs relied on the press release in making
his decision to sell, although only one actually saw the article, and one plaintiff testified that he
had no recollection of how he received the information. Id at 558-61.
21. Eg., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969); Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 84-85 (M.D. Fla. 1977); In re United States Fin. Sec,
Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 41-44 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Kesler v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 66 F.R.D.
43, 47-49 (S.D. Iowa 1975); Werfel v. Kramarksy, 61 F.R.D. 674, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re
Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 99-101 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). Arguably this is in contravention of the Supreme Court's authority to prescribe
rules of procedure. Congress explicitly provided that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right" of any litigant. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
22. 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). See Frankel, Some
Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23 43 F.R.D. 39, 47 (1968) (advocating the use of
split trials in rule 23(b)(3) actions).
[Vol. 62
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as a solution to the "individual reliance-relaxed reliance" conflict. A trial is
initially conducted on the common issue whether the defendants made any
material misstatements.23 If there is a determination adverse to defendants,
separate trials are held on the questions of liability and damages. These ques-
tions often turn on individual issues of reliance24 and causation. The Green
solution of bifurcated trials, however, was correctly criticized as merely post-
poning the inevitable: a determination on the manageability of the class
action.25
Accordingly, courts looked to another solution, a more objective theory
that would make common to the class the previously subjective, individual
issue of reliance. This was accomplished by equating materiality with reli-
ance. In re Memorex Security Cases26 is an early illustrative case. The court
recognized its creation of different reliance requirements for negotiated and
open market transactions.27 Nevertheless, basing its decision on the desire to
permit the use of class actions in securities fraud litigation, 28 the court
adopted an objective standard of reliance to eliminate "the overwhelming task
of examining the subjective intent of each class member in his decision with
respect to his stock."'29
Causation also presents problems in class action certifications. Plaintiffs
usually are purchasers alleging that they were harmed by purchasing stock at
prices artificially inflated by reason of defendants' actions. Defendants argue
that any misstatement's effect on the market price would vary over time, re-
quiring individual determination of each plaintiffs damages and thereby mak-
ing litigation unmanageable as a class action under rule 23(b)(3). Courts,
however, typically downplay the significance of the damages issues. 30
23. In a fraud case involving multiple defendants and misstatements made over a period of
time, it is debatable whether these are indeed common questions. See supra note 19. Most courts
have held that they are, and have found a "common course of conduct," reasoning that the earlier
misstatements caused the later ones to fall into error, like "standing dominoes." E.g., Herbst v.
Able, 47 F.R.D. II, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
24. The court in Green left open the issue whether reliance was required, 406 F.2d at 301.
25. Eg., In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 69 F.R.D. 24, 43 (S.D. Cal. 1975); see In re
Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Manageability is one of the factors the
court must consider in determining class action certification under rule 23(b)(3). See supra note
16.
26. 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
27. See id at 99-100.
28. "[I]t appears that reliance of the actual, subjective, individual nature necessary in the
classical fraud case would unnecessarily encumber large lob-5 actions and thereby thwart the
Congressional interest in providing a means by which investors may recover against market ma-
nipulators in federal court." Id. at 99.
29. Id. at 100. Another early case, Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), rea-
soned that "[tihe question of reliance, itself, may well be one of those claims typical of the claims
of the entire class," which is one way to transform an individual issue into a common one.
30. There are few securities opinions involving open market investors that discuss damages,
except theoretically; most cases are settled prior to the determination of damages. Although it
only considered limited data, one study found that settlement generally occurs before the determi-
nation of class certification; even when certification is denied, a substantial number of cases are
still settled. Kennedy, Securities Class and DenrativeActions in the United States District Courtfor
the Northern District of Texas: .An Empirical Study, 14 Hous. L. REv. 769, 797, 810-15 (1977).
Two measures of recovery are common: restitution and out of pocket loss. The former is the
traditional measure of damages in rule lOb-5 cases and was approved by the Supreme Court in
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Two Supreme Court decisions, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lie Co. 31 and Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States,32 furthered the demise of the subjective
reliance element by emphasizing the objective materiality element. In Mills
minority shareholders alleged, under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 33 that
shareholder approval of a merger had been obtained by means of a materially
misleading proxy statement. The Seventh Circuit, while upholding the lower
court's determination that the proxy statement was materially deficient, ques-
tioned whether the misstatements had caused the shareholders any harm.34
The court noted that in a common-law action for fraud plaintiff would have to
establish reliance on the misstatement. Because "[r]eliance by thousands of
individuals, as here, can scarcely be inquired into,"35 however, the Seventh
Circuit decided that the determinative issue was the fairness of the merger
terms. It reasoned that if the terms were fair the shareholders suffered no
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972), involving direct negotiations.
See supra notes 44-55 and accompanying text. For open market investors, the better view is that
out of pocket recovery should be used, Le., the difference between what was paid for the stock and
what it was actually worth at the time of the transaction. E.g., Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555-56 (5th Cir.), modifled on other grounds mem., 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.
1981), aftd inpart, rev'd in part on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F.
Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afdmem. , 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1977). See Note, The Measure
of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371 (1974).
A variation of the out of pocket measure is that plaintiffs recover the difference between what they
paid and the value of the securities at the time the fraud is or should have been discovered. E.g.,
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94,105 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). Cf Harris v.
American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs recover the difference between
what they paid and the stock's value at the time knowledge of the fraud is publicly disseminated),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976). When the complaint is that plaintiffs paid an inflated price for
the stock, those plaintiffs who sold the stock during the period of inflated price must have their
recovery reduced by the amount of recaptured inflated value. Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curium) (Sneed, J., concurring). Courts adopt-
ing the fraud on the market theory believe that the actual value of the stock over the period can be
determined by expert testimony; accordingly, awarding the appropriate recovery to each plaintiff
becomes mechanical. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976); see In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 148-49 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
Notwithstanding the above, some courts have stated that it is within the trial court's discre-
tion to apply a rescissionary measure of recovery, i.e., the difference between the price paid and
the stock's value at a later date, usually either the date of sale of the stock or the date the suit is
instituted. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970) (not an open
market transaction). This method promotes manageability of a class action, because it eliminates
both the necessity of determining the stock's varying theoretical value over the relevant time pe-
riod and the problems of conflicts between class members who sold the stock and those who did
not. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J.,
concurring). The flaw in the rescissionary measure is that it permits plaintiffs to recover for all
declines in the stock price, even those caused by factors unrelated to the misstatement: "Wrong-
doing defendants should not be mulcted to make simple the management of a class proceeding
under rule lob-5." Id. Compare Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir.),
modfled on other grounds mem 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (rescission measure rejected) with Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., 570 F.2d 38,49 (2d Cir.) (rescission measure applied, but reduced to reflect decline in general
market conditions), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). See Note, supra, at 386.
31. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
32. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
34. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1968).
35. Id. at 436 n.10.
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injury, because a sufficient number of them would have voted to authorize the
merger even if there had been accurate disclosure.
The Supreme Court, although vacating the Seventh Circuit's opinion,
agreed that the court could not examine individual issues of reliance.36 It dis-
approved, however, of the appeals court's alternative of reviewing the fairness
of the merger terms. 37 Instead, the Court emphasized the requirement of ma-
teriality38 as a substitute for proof of individual reliance. Thus, in Mills the
Supreme Court explicitly recognized, in a section 14(a) action, the practical
considerations of maintaining a class action as a rationale for eliminating
proof of individual reliance.39
Both section 14(a) and rule 14a-9, 40 on the one hand, and section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5, on the other, are implied remedies for false and misleading
statements. Mills, however, is distinguishable from rule lOb-5 cases on several
significant grounds. First, when shareholders bring suit based on a misleading
proxy statement sent to them as part of a proxy solicitation process, reliance is
more appropriately presumed because there is a greater likelihood that at least
a sizeable number of those in the plaintiff class have read some portions of the
document.4 1 Second, a shareholder is directly harmed, whether or not he
reads the proxy statement, or even if he reads it and is not misled, if a suffi-
cient number of shareholders are misled by the proxy statement to vote in
favor of the proposed action.42 Third, courts tend to recognize a more direct
connection between misstatement and harm in the context of a proxy solicita-
tion.43 Finally, the number of plaintiffs is determinable, although it may be
36. Mills, 396 U.S. at 380.
37. In the Court's view, this approach would immunize all misstatements that did not relate
to the merger terms and would discourage shareholders from bringing actions to enforce the proxy
rules. Id. at 382.
38. "There is no need to supplement this [materiality] requirement. . . with a requirement of
proof of whether the defect actually had a decisive effect on the voting. Where there has been a
finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between
the violation and the injury. ... Id. at 384-85.
39. The Court left open the questions whether there would be causation when management
controlled enough votes to assure authorization of the transaction, but referred to a district court
case that held there would be sufficient causation in this situation. Id. at 385 n.7. Lower courts in
the Second Circuit have split on this issue. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d
374, 378 n.7 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), and cases cited therein.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1983).
41. The proxy rules are very likely the most effective disclosure device in the SEC
scheme of things. The proxy literature, unlike the application for registration and the
statutory reports, gets into the hands of investors. Unlike the Securities Act prospectus,
it gets there in time. It is more readable than any of these other documents. And it gets
to a great many people who never see a prospectus.
3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1027. The length and complexity of the typical merger proxy statement,
however, may deter shareholders from reading it. Freund & Greene, Substance Over Form S-14.:
A Proposal to Reform SEC Regulation of NegotiatedAcquistions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1483, 1493 (1981).
42. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir.) (that some share-
holders discovered misstatement before vote on the merger not a defense to rule lob-5 violation
involving proxy solicitation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Hershfang v. Knotter, 11982-83
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,203 (E.D. Va. April 25, 1983) (plaintiff has standing
to assert § 14(a) claim despite apparent lack of reliance).
43. Because of this recognition of more direct harm, courts have found negligence the appro-
priate standard of culpability in § 14(a) damage claims, notwithstanding the requirement of scien-
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large. Because of these significant distinctions, the Mills rationale is not suffi-
ciently persuasive authority for abandoning the reliance requirement in rule
lOb-5 actions.
The Supreme Court opinion, Affiliated Vte Citizens v. United States," ad-
dressed the reliance requirement in a rule lOb-5 case involving rather unusual
facts. Plaintiffs, mixed-bloods of the Ute Indian Tribe, sued a bank and two of
its employees. The bank had acted as transfer agent for stock of a corporation
formed for the purpose of distributing tribal assets. Although the bank had
been requested to discourage resales of the stock, its employees had actively
encouraged a secondary market among non-Indians. Indeed, they had "de-
vised a plan and induced the mixed-blood holders of [the] stock to dispose of
their shares without disclosing to them material facts that reasonably could
have been expected to influence their decisions to sell."'45 The Supreme Court
held that the appeals court had read rule lOb-5 too restrictively in requiring
evidence that plaintiffs had relied on misstatements made by the employees,
since "[as market makers] they possessed the affirmative duty under the Rule
to disclose this fact to the mixed-blood sellers."4 6
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the distinction between para-
graph (2) of rule lOb-5, on the one hand, and paragraphs (1) and (3), on the
other.47 While the former premises liability on material misstatements, and
thus is closely related to common-law fraud,48 the latter provisions are
broader, encompassing "'a course of business' or a device, scheme or artifice"
that operates as a fraud.49 Accordingly:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to
disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery.
All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material. . . .This
obligation to disclose and this withholding of a material fact estab-
lish the requisite element of causation in fact.50
Despite the unique facts of Affiliated Ute, which suggest its applicability is
limited to situations involving direct negotiations between purchaser and
seller,5 ' it has been widely interpreted as eliminating plaintiff's need to estab-
lish reliance in nondisclosure cases involving open market transactions.5 2
Based on Affiliated Ute, courts accord plaintiff a presumption of reliance in
ter in rule lOb-5 cases. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1973).
44. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
45. Id. at 153.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 152-53. For text of rule lOb-5, see supra note I.
48. For discussion of common-law fraud elements, see supra note 2.
49. Affiliated lie, 406 U.S. at 153.
50. Id. at 153-54.
51. The Court found a duty to disclose because it found the relationship between plaintiffs
and the bank employees comparable to a fiduciary relationship. Sce Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (no duty to disclose in absence of fiduciary relationship).
52. Eg., Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 1978); Rifkin v.
Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262-63 (5th Cir. 1978); Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 62 F.R.D. 466, 471
(E.D. Pa. 1974). See infra note 148.
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nondisclosure cases and, in so doing, shift the burden to defendant to prove
plaintiff's nonreliance.53 Some courts extend Affiliated Ute further and hold
that, in open market transactions involving misrepresentations, plaintiff need
prove only materiality,54 thus eliminating the distinction between misrepre-
sentations and omissions.55
Two significant Second Circuit opinions, Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp.56 and Chris-Craft Industries v. PiperAircraft Corp. ,57 developed the Af
flliated Ute distinction between misrepresentations and fraudulent schemes. 58
They held that victims of schemes to manipulate stock prices need only estab-
lish causation and not reliance.59
In Schlick,60 brought under rule lOb-5, plaintiff challenged a merger be-
tween two affiliated corporations in which an exchange ratio unfair to the mi-
nority shareholders allegedly had been achieved through the majority
shareholder's stock manipulation. The district court dismissed the complaint
"for want of the necessary causal connection."' 61 The appeals court acknowl-
edged that a plaintiff in a misrepresentations case would have to show reliance
and that a plaintiff in an omissions case would have to show materiality.
When, however, plaintiff alleged a fraudulent scheme involving market ma-
nipulation, of which misstatements were but one aspect, he need only show
causation. Plaintiff satisfied this requirement by alleging that the minority
shareholders were forced to exchange their stock on the basis of an unfair
exchange ratio. Plaintiff thus established his claim upon a showing that the
fraudulent scheme caused his economic injury.62
53. Eg., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1974); Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 85 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
54. Eg., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972). See also Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir.) (reliance not an
independent element necessary to establish cause of action), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
55. Eg., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1981). The
Third Circuit rejected the omission-misrepresentation distinction in assigning the burden of proof
on reliance, in favor of a flexible approach. The Third Circuit required the court to "analyze the
plaintiff's allegations, in light of the likely proof at trial, and determine the most reasonable place-
ment of the burden of proof of reliance." Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). See also Herm v. Stafford, 461 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (W.D.
Ky. 1978) (allegations involving misrepresentations and omissions cannot be strictly categorized);
Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 84 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (too simplistic to categorize claims as
involving either misrepresentations or omissions).
That the distinction between omissions and misrepresentations can be determinative is illus-
trated by comparing Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978), with Dekro
v. Stem Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
56. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
57. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
59. Accord Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
970 (1967).
60. 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
61. Id. at 378. The district court also apparently did not think that the alleged violations
stated a claim under federal law. Id. at 377 n.5.
62. In Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967), also involving a forced merger, the court regarded reliance as unnecessary in a case in
which plaintiff had no choice but to relinquish his shares.
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In Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,63 Chris-Craft, the de-
feated tender offeror in the struggle to obtain control of Piper Aircraft, sued
Bangor Punta, the successful tender offeror, for misstatements made during
the tender offer. The Second Circuit held that Chris-Craft could maintain
such a claim under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act6 even though it had not
relied on Bangor Punta's alleged misstatements, since Chris-Craft's harm did
not depend "upon the exercise of volition by [it], but instead upon the exercise
of volition by other persons." '65
The Supreme Court dismissed Chris-Craft's suit on the ground that a de-
feated tender offeror lacks standing to sue for damages under section 14(e). 66
In addition, the Court noted, in dictum, that Chris-Craft would not have had
standing had it brought its claim as a Piper stockholder:
As a tender offeror actively engaged in competing for Piper stock,
Chris-Craft was not in the posture of a target shareholder confronted
with the decision of whether to tender or retain its stock. Conse-
quently, Chris-Craft could scarcely have alleged a need for the dis-
closures mandated by the Williams Act.67
From this language it appears that the Court contemplated a direct reliance
requirement in cases under section 14(e) involving misstatements. 6 In another
part of the opinion, however, the Court indicated that Chris-Craft would have
had standing to litigate Bangor Punta's rule lOb-6 violations69 if Chris-Craft
had alleged that it paid an inflated price for Piper stock because of Bangor
Punta's fraudulent scheme: if it had sued as "a hoodwinked investor victim-
ized by market manipulation." 70
The Supreme Court's Chris-Craft opinion thus supports the view that, un-
like a plaintiff alleging injury because of misstatements, a plaintiff alleging
injury because of a stock manipulation scheme need not show reliance. The
former claim, essentially a common-law deceit case, is based on paragraph (2)
of rule lOb-5, while the stock manipulation claim is based on paragraphs (1)
and (3). The difficulty with this analysis is drawing a distinction between mis-
statements that affect the stock's price and other forms of stock manipula-
tion,7' since any material misstatement will affect the stock's price.
63. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
65. Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 373.
66. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 430 U.S. 1 (1976).
67. Id. at 35.
68. Since § 14(e) was patterned after rule lOb-5, courts look to decisions interpreting § 14(e)
for guidance in interpreting rule lOb-5.
69. Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 43-44. Rule lOb-6 generally prohibits a participant in a securities
distribution from bidding for or purchasing securities of the same class. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6
(1983). Its purpose is to prevent manipulation of the stock prce to facilitate its distribution. See
Proposed Amendment to Rule lOb-6, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,482, 11,483 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.106-6) (proposed Mar. 3, 1982).
70. Chris-Craft, 430 U.S. at 45.
71. See infra note 137.
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II. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
There is no uniform fraud on the market theory; rather, the theory takes
three forms, represented by three leading cases. In Blackie v. Barrack72 plain-
tiffs brought a class action, seeking to represent purchasers of a corporation's
common stock over a twenty-seven month period. They alleged that some
forty-five documents released publicly by the corporation contained material
misstatements that artificially inflated the price of the stock. Defendants re-
sisted class action certification by asserting, among other arguments, that di-
rect proof of subjective reliance by each class member was necessary to
establish rule lOb-5 liability. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating
that subjective reliance was not a distinct element of proof in rule lOb-5 claims
involving open market transactions.73
First, the court noted that plaintiffs' substantive claims were or could be
stated in terms of omissions.74 Relying onAffiliated Ute,75 the court held that
"positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery."7 6 Second, and
more significantly, the court treated the claims as involving misrepresentations
and relied on precedent for the following proposition:
Proof of subjective reliance on particular misrepresentations is un-
necessary to establish a lOb-5 claim for a deception inflating the price
of stock traded in the open market. . . .Proof of reliance is adduced
to demonstrate the causal connection between the defendant's
wrongdoing and the plaintiffs loss. We think causation is ade-
quately established in the impersonal stock exchange context by
proof of purchase and of the materiality of misrepresentations, with-
out direct proof of reliance. Materiality circumstantially establishes
the reliance of some market traders and hence the inflation in the.
stock price-when the purchase is made the causational chain be-
tween defendant's conduct and plaintiffs loss is sufficiently estab-
lished to make out a prima facie case.77
The court's discussion of the role of reliance in a rule lOb-5 claim is sub-
ject to two interpretations. Under the prevailing view, reliance is not elimi-
nated as an element in establishing a rule lOb-5 claim. Rather, plaintiff is
afforded a rebuttable presumption of indirect reliance, necessarily easing his
72. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
73. Id. at 905.
74. For example; the corporation's financial statements failed to disclose the need for ade-
quate reserves. One commentator has criticized the court of appeals' reasoning, since in the con-
text of a reporting corporation these so-called omissions are really failures to disclose information
necessary to prevent already available information from being misleading, or half-truths, which
are treated as misrepresentations. Ruder, Judicial Developments Under Rule 10b-5: Standing, Scd-
enter, Reliance, Materialiy and Implied Rights of Action, 7 INST. ON SEc. REG. 303, 325 (1976).
Affiliated Ute, however, can also be interpreted as a misrepresentation case, since the failure to
disclose that higher prices were available in the secondary market was also an implied misrepre-
sentation that the offered price was fair.
75. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
76. 524 F.2d at 905 (quoting Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153).
77. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906.
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burden in establishing a prima facie case.78 Thus, the purchaser in open mar-
ket transactions indirectly relies on the accuracy of the corporation's public
documents, since "he relies generally on the supposition that the market price
is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the
price."79
A defendant has four defenses under the prevailing view. The first two
are common to the class as a whole and relate to materiality and causation.
The remaining two are specific rebuttals of an individual plaintiff's reliance.
First, defendant can disprove the materiality of the misstatement.80 If it was
not material, any disparity between price and value must have been due to
factors not attributable to defendant's misconduct. Second, even if the mis-
statement was material, defendant can defeat plaintiff's claim by showing that
an insufficient number of traders relied on it, and that the price was not af-
fected by it.8 ' This would be the case when sophisticated traders saw through
the misstatement8 2 or when information from other sources discredited it.83
Third, defendant could prove that an individual plaintiff had purchased de-
spite his knowledge of the material misstatement. Fourth, defendant could
prove that an individual plaintiff would have purchased even if he had known
of the falsity.84 In the latter two defenses, defendant uses plaintiff's nonreli-
ance to limit the chain of causation.85
Backie also can be interpreted as a "pure causation" approach to rule
lOb-5 liability. Under this view, the only purpose of reliance is to establish
causation;8 6 when causation can be established by other means, a showing of
reliance becomes unnecessary. For example, in open market transactions cau-
78. The Blackie court characterized a requirement of direct reliance as an "unreasonable and
irrelevant evidentiary burden." Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907.
79. Id. The court inn re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980), extended the
analysis by basing a presumption of indirect reliance on the efficient market thesis:
Many investors ... utilize the very efficiency of the market as the affirmative basis for
making securities purchases. These investors rely directly on the market to evaluate in-
formation for them rather than making their independent analysis of stocks; any reliance
of the market on information is thus reliance by these investors.
Id See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
80. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906.
81. Id
82. For studies concluding that investors are not fooled by accounting practices that cause an
apparent increase in profitability, see Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 5, at 6
n.19. See also Fischel, The Law, supra note 7, at 720-21.
83. See, e.g., Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
84. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 906.
85. Professor Fischel correctly notes that allowing these defenses of nonreliance is logically
inconsistent, since defendants caused these plaintiffs economic injury, and criticizes Blackie for
applying the traditional tort elements to the fraud on the market theory. See Fischel, Use o/
Modern Finance Theory, supra note 5, at 11. Blackie's approach, however, can be rationalized if
based on judicial concern that defendants' potential liability would otherwise be too great. See
Dooley, The Effects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L.
REv. 776, 819 n.203 (1972); Painter, Inside Information: Growing Painsfor the Development o/
Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1370-71 (1965). In addi-
tion, defendants should not be liable to those who knowingly assumed the risk of the investment.
86. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 976 (1975). Cf Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir.
1981) ("The element of reliance serves to restrict the potentially limitless thrust of rule lOb-5 to
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sation is established by showing that the misstatement is material because a
sufficient number of market traders relied on it to cause the price increase.8 7
Injury, therefore, is suffered by all who purchased the stock between the date
when the material misstatement affected the price and the date when the truth
was sufficiently disseminated to bring the price of the stock down to its "true"
value. Thus, a material misstatement establishes plaintiff's prima facie case.
The only defense is to defeat the showing of causation by either of the first two
defenses discussed above. Under the pure causation approach, the remaining
two defenses relating to issues of individual reliance are irrelevant.
Many courts, assuming that Blackie is an extension ofAffiliated Ute's pre-
sumption of reliance, adopt the first interpretation of Blackie and state that the
presumption is rebuttable.88 Plaintiffs nonreliance can then be raised defen-
sively:8 9 that plaintiff did not read the report;90 that he did not request to see
those situations in which there exists causation in fact between the defendant's act and the plain-
tiff's injury.").
87. The post-Blackie fraud on the market cases were brought by purchasers alleging artificial
price inflation because management concealed unfavorable data. Similarly, investors who sell
while a stock price is artificially depressed, because management concealed favorable information
would also suffer economic injury. A fraud on the market case alleging artificial depression with-
out insider trading is unlikely, since corporate insiders have an incentive to conceal good news
only long enough to purchase the stock at bargain prices. In the absence of insider trading, the
corporation would be liable under rule lOb-5 only if it had a duty to disclose the favorable data.
Courts normally do not question the timing of the corporation's disclosure; instead they ques-
tion the adequacy of the disclosure. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The timing of the disclosure, in the absence of insider
trading or prior inaccurate disclosure, falls within management discretion, which is protected by
the business judgment rule. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 851-52
(2d Cir. 1981); see Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982). But see Allen, The
Disclosure Obligation of Publicly Held Corporations in the Absence of Insider Trading, 25 MERCER
L. REV. 479, 496 (1974) ("[T]here seems to be an evolving concept of a duty of full disclosure to
the securities markets in general, even in the absence of insider trading."); Bauman, Rule 10b-5
and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEo. L.J. 935, 988 (1979) ("Only a disclo-
sure duty that applied irrespective of trading will fully meet the informational needs of
investors.").
88. E.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Sullivan
v. Chase Inv. Services, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 246, 262 (N.D. Cal. 1978). One court has gone so far as to
say that although Affiliated Ute relaxes the reliance requirement, plaintiff must at least demon-
strate an awareness of the corporate document. Kennedy v. Nicastro, 517 F. Supp. 1157, 1160
(N.D. Ill. 1981).
89. Jezarian v. Csapo, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,692 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); see Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla.
1982). Other cases involve decisions on class certification, when the assertions of individual non-
reliance were used as arguments against class certification. Eg., Arthur Young & Co. v. United
States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). It appears, how-
ever, that the courts viewed nonreliance as a means of defeating plaintiff's substantive claim and
not, as defendants urged, as grounds to defeat class certification. See Markewich v. Ersek, [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CC) 98,213 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Beissinger v. Rockwood
Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. PA. 1981); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254, 258-60
(N.D. Ill. 1981); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex 1980); Tanzer v. Sharon Steel
Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,915 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Greenspan v.
Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Cf. Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 174
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (when plaintiffs allege fraud on the market, the "speculative possibility that the
defendants may have a right to show nonreliance. . . is not enough to defeat a class action").
90. Tanzer v. Sharon Steel Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,915
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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the report;9 ' that he relied on another's recommendation; 92 that he made the
investment decision for reasons unrelated to the misstatements; 93 that he knew
the falsity of the statement;94 or, that he relied on his own investigation.95
A few courts adopt the second interpretation and read Blackie as a pure
causation case.96 They reason that there is general reliance on the market to
employ all available information to set a price reflecting the actual value of the
stock.97 This reliance has been found even when a plaintiff testified that she
did not consider the price of the stock when she decided to buy it.98
The most extreme form of the pure causation approach is exemplified by
a decision in which plaintiff sold the stock short, anticipating a price decline,
and claimed injury because the price actually rose, allegedly on the basis of
subsequent material misstatements.99 The district court, while doubting that
fraud on the market was the law in its circuit, nevertheless permitted plaintiff
to recover under the most expansive theory of fraud on the market. Clearly
the plaintiff could not have relied on the misstatement in any sense, and the
court permitted recovery solely on the basis of economic loss. Other courts
have not clearly articulated their understanding of Blackie. t00
91. Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
92. Id. at 786-87; Kiernan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980); Markewich v.
Ersek, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,213 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Greenspan
v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
93. Kiernan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1980).
94. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla.
1982).
95. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1977).
96. The Ninth Circuit, in its later opinion, Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct.,
549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), was ambiguous in its interpretation of
Blackie. The court acknowledged that Blackie permits defendants to introduce evidence of an
individual plaintiffs nonreliance to "disprove the causal relationship between defendants' wrong-
ful conduct and plaintiffs decision to invest." Id at 695. Nevertheless, the court found defend-
ants' offer of proof on nonreliance insignificant on the class certification issue. Moreover,
discussion of Blackie in another part of the opinion suggests that this court is moving close to
dispensing with reliance altogether. See id at 694-95. In addition, since defendants' ability to
defeat the presumption of reliance is largely theoretical in class actions, as a practical matter
reliance is eliminated as an element.
[ihe possibility that defendants may attempt to rebut the presumption of reliance as to
each class member is not enough to defeat class action. . . . It is unrealistic. . . to now
assume that because reliance would only be "presumed" the supposed common issue will
unravel into thousands of unmanageable "mini-trials." This is true, given the force of
the presumption (carrying a burden of proving a purchase would have been made even if
the truth were known) with the resulting reality that the contest would likely be futile in
the vast number of cases.
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
97. See Shores v. Sklar, 610 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1980), aft'd en banc, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983); Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542
F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982).
98. Abrams v. Johns-Manville Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,348 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In another case, involving omissions, the court thought it "dubious"
that proof of nonreliance would defeat the claim. Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
99. Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982).
See also Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
100. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980), is
often cited as an early espousal of the fraud on the market theory, but its interpretation of Blackie
[Vol. 62
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Panzirer v. Wolf'O° shows a second form of the fraud on the market the-
ory. Plaintiff purchased stock in a corporation that subsequently declared
bankruptcy. She charged that there were material misstatements in its annual
report, which she conceded she had not read. Rather, she decided to purchase
the stock after reading a newspaper column reporting favorably on the corpo-
ration's prospects and after speaking to her broker. She claimed that the arti-
cle would not have been so optimistic if the annual report had been accurate.
The Second Circuit, reversing the trial court,' 0 2 held that plaintiff's theory
stated a causal connection between her loss and the annual report; thus plain-
tiff's theory could not be dismissed on summary judgment.
While the Second Circuit saw its decision as a logical extension of Black-
ie, it noted a critical distinction between the two cases. The court viewed
Blackie as a case of indirect reliance on the market price to reflect the worth of
the stock, as determined by the publicly available information. In Wo/f, how-
ever, plaintiff did not rely on the market price in making her investment deci-
sion. 103 Nevertheless, the court found that plaintiff did rely indirectly on the
annual report because she reasonably could expect that the "information
heard on the street" would accurately reflect the information contained
therein. 104 Hence, plaintiff was entitled to prove that if the report were accu-
rate, the article would not have mentioned the future prospects of the corpora-
tion favorably, and she would not have purchased the stock.105
Although characterizing its decision as one involving indirect reliance, the
court really dispenses altogether with the reliance requirement. While it
speaks of a fraud on the market plaintiff having a "presumption of reliance,"
the court does not develop this concept and provides no analysis of what, if
anything, would rebut this presumption. 0 6 The opinion makes clear, how-
is unclear. The court stated that in rule lOb-5 cases, reliance is presumed when the material
misrepresentation affected the price of stock traded on the open market. Id. at 553. The court did
not address the issue whether this presumption is rebuttable. In another part of the opinion, the
court implied that it is rebuttable, since it made reference to "open market investors who relied on
misleading market information." Id at 556. Cf. Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386
(S.D.N.Y. 198 1) (suggestion that even proof of nonreliance will not defeat rule 1Ob-5 claim involv-
ing omissions).
101. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982).
102. The trial court held that plaintiff had relied primarily on the newspaper article in making
her decision to purchase the stock, and thus her reliance on the integrity of the market was only
secondary. Panzirer v. Wolf, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,251
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), mod(fed by [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,363
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
103. The court observed that the attractiveness of the investment would be enhanced by a
lower price. Wo/, 663 F.2d at 367 n.3.
104. Id. at 368.
105. Where the plaintiff acts upon information from those working in or reporting on the
securities markets, and where that information is circulated after a material misrepresen-
tation or omission, plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim of reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion or omission.
Id. at 367. The court found that plaintiff's lack of credibility, however, made her an inadequate
class representative under rule 23(a)(4). Id at 368.
106. Referring to its earlier decision in Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Hor-
wath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975), the court stated that "the fact that plaintiff must
trace her reliance on defendant's alleged fraud through the reactions of third parties does not
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ever, that plaintiffs failure to rely on the market price does not rebut the pre-
sumption. Instead, the opinion emphasizes the chain of causation linking the
alleged misstatement to plaintiffs investment decision. Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit's Wolf opinion can be characterized as a pure causation case.
Shores v. Sklar10 7 represents the third form of the fraud on the market
theory. Plaintiff had purchased revenue bonds' 08 that dropped drastically in
value shortly after their sale due to default by the lessee of the industrial busi-
ness premises. Plaintiff admitted that he had not seen the offering circular, but
bought the bonds because of his broker's recommendations. He alleged that
the issuance of the bonds resulted from a fraudulent scheme "so pervasive that
without it the issuer could not have issued, the dealer could not have dealt in,
and the buyer would not have bought these Bonds, because they would not
have been offered on the market at any price."' 0 9 The district court entered
summary judgment for the defendants, because the plaintiff had not relied on
the circular's alleged misstatements. The Fifth Circuit reversed, reasoning as
follows:
The securities laws and regulations have a purpose broader than
merely criticizing ever-lengthening, complex prospectuses. They
cover deliberate, manipulative schemes to defraud which can annul
not only the purpose of disclosure but also the market's honest
function.110
Accordingly, while plaintiffs failure to read the circular barred him from
asserting that it contained material misstatements under rule lOb-5(2), plaintiff
had stated a claim, under paragraphs (1) and (3) of the rule, based on fraud in
bringing the bonds to the market."I If plaintiff proved that he was willing to
purchase any bonds that were "entitled to be marketed""12 and that he was
willing to accept any marketable risk, he would establish his reliance on "the
integrity of the offerings of the securities market."' "13 Causation would be es-
tablished by proving defendant's scheme to defraud investors by offering
bonds not entitled to be marketed.
In analyzing the distinctions between rule lOb-5 claims under paragraphs
(1) and (3), on the one hand, and paragraph (2), on the other, the Fifth Circuit
stated the following:
vitiate her claim under lOb-5." Wolf, 663 F.2d at 368. See also Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1979), cerl. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980), discussed supra note 100. Bul see Axelrod v.
Cities Service Co., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,131 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
17, 1983) (because plaintiff did not directly rely on disclosure document, he would be subject to
atypical defense in class action and thus was inadequate class representative).
107. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983). The judges of
the Fifth Circuit were split 12-10 in this decision.
108. Although revenue bonds are not required to be registered under the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1982), offers and sales of bonds are not exempt from the antifraud provisions
of either that Act, id § 77q(a), or the Exchange Act, id § 78j(b).
109. Shores, 647 F.2d at 464 n.2.
110. Id. at 464.
111. See sura 'note I (text of rule lob-5).
112. Shores 647 F.2d at 471.
113. Id. at 469.
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Whenever the Rule lOb-5 issue shifts from misrepresentation or
omission in a document to fraud on a broader scale, the search for
causation must shift also. . . . [R]ule lOb-5 is not limited to a nar-
row right to recover for knowing fraudulent misrepresentations or
omissions in disclosure documents which mislead a securities buyer.
The rule is recognized also to provide a basis for a federal cause of
action for more elaborate, intentional schemes which deceive or de-
fraud purchasers of securities.1 14
Thus, the Fifth Circuit relies on the same distinction between garden-variety
misstatements and large-scale fraud, drawn inAffiliated Ute and developed in
the stock manipulation cases of the Second Circuit, as a basis for its version of
fraud on the market theory.115
The Shores version of the fraud on the market theory, followed in the
Tenth Circuit and in a number of lower courts,' 16 differs from Blackie by not
affording plaintiff a presumption of indirect reliance on the oflering circular
that would allow plaintiff to state a claim under rule lOb-5(2). Since Shores
involved municipal bonds, which generally are not widely followed by ana-
lysts or heavily traded, it would have been inappropriate to extend to plaintiff
the Blackie presumption of indirect reliance; the information contained in the
offering circular would not be readily available in the marketplace. 117 Thus,
the Shores court probably was correct in dismissing the claims based on fraud-
ulent misstatements, although the lack of evidence about the nature of the
broker's recommendations and the source of his information is curious. Nev-
ertheless, the court's distinction between facts that merely decrease the securi-
ties' value, on the one hand, and facts that make the securities valueless and
hence unmarketable, on the other, is a difficult one to draw, if it is a distinction
at all, since someone would always buy the securities at some price. 18 In
subsequent cases courts have been receptive to plaintiffs' assertions that the
misstatements made the securities unmarketable. 1 9 This expansive reading of
Shores converts this version of fraud on the market into a pure causation case
with repect to all forms of misstatements.
From a review of these cases, it appears that those courts that have
adopted some version of the fraud on the market theory are motivated by a
strong concern for protecting the open market investor. Accordingly, they rea-
son that the requirement of reliance developed because of rule lOb-5's close
resemblance to the common-law tort of deceit. They argue that even though
114. Id. at 472.
115. See supra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
116. T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th
Cir. 1983); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Util. Auth., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,224 (W.D. Mo. April 18, 1983); In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litig., [1982-83 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 99,157 (S.D. Calif. March 24, 1983); Lipton v. Documation,
Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,788 (M.D. Fla. August 18, 1982); Dekro
v. Stem Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537
F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982); Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. IM. 1981).
117. See infra notes 232-37 and accompanying text.
118. See Shores, 647 F.2d at 486 (Randall, J., dissenting).
119. See supra note 116.
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the requirement may still be appropriate in negotiated transactions, today's
rule lOb-5 claim alleging fraud on a large scale has moved light-years away
from the common-law tort. 120 Open market investors victimized by fraud, as
a distinct class of litigants, should have a remedy; open market investors who
bought the stock at a price substantially different from its intrinsic value cer-
tainly have been injured; to impose a direct reliance requirement, therefore, is
to bar arbitrarily certain plaintiffs who suffered the same injury as those who
can fortuitously establish direct reliance. Moreover, these courts believe that
enforcement of the securities laws is most effectively achieved through class
actions, 121 which in turn can only be maintained if the fraud on the market
theory is available to eliminate individual issues of reliance.122 Accordingly,
courts have looked for ways of replacing proof of individual reliance with
proof of a common and more objective reliance.
The argument for acceptance of the fraud on the market theory is fre-
quently summarized in Blackie's assertion that an investor has the right to rely
on "the supposition that the market price is validly set and that no unsus-
pected manipulation has artificially inflated the price."' 123 Hence, it is argued
that if an investor establishes his reliance on the market price he has met his
reliance requirement in establishing a prima facie case under rule lOb-5. Im-
plicit in this argument is an acceptance of the efficient market thesis, which
states that publicly available information affecting a corporation's prospects is
rapidly absorbed by the market, that the information has an immediate impact
on the stock price,124 and that the marketplace reacts to both true and false
data.' 25 Thus, in an attenuated way, every investor "relies" on any false infor-
mation when he purchases stock at the prevailing market price.
An investor, however, by trading in the stock, necessarily must accept the
risk that the stock's price varies from its value. The availability of a good deal
of information about a corporation provides no assurance that it is accurate
information. Moreover, even if the information is factually accurate, it is sub-
ject to misinterpretation by the market.126 While an investor necessarily must
120. Recent Supreme Court opinions lend support to this view. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1983) ("[Tlhe antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not
coextensive with common law doctrines."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 744-45 (1975) ("[Ihe typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and
deceit evolved was light years from the world of commercial transactions to which Rule lob-5 is
applicable."). For discussion of the common-law tort elements, see supra note 2.
121. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text. The courts believe that without effective
enforcement, corporate management will not be deterred from issuing fraudulent statements.
122. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub norn., Price
Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 103 S. Ct. 434 (1982); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
123. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 890, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
The phrase "fraud on the market" originated in Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
In Herbst plaintiffs alleged that misstatements had caused an artificial inflation in the price of the
common stock, which induced them to convert their debentures into common stock. Since a deci-
sion to convert debt into stock is based principally on the market price of the stock, in such a case
there is direct reliance on the price in making the decision.
124. See supra notes 7-8.
125. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 5, at 5.
126. The large-scale frauds perpetrated on the marketplace in recent years, like those in In re
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purchase or sell stock at the prevailing market price, if he wishes to trade in
the stock, he does not necessarily rely on the stock's price as the best available
indicator of its value, since he can have no assurance that it accurately reflects
the corporation's worth. Indeed, many investors purchase or sell stock be-
cause they believe the price inaccurately reflects the corporation's worth.
In addition to asserting the right to rely on the market price, plaintiffs also
have argued that they have a right to rely on the integrity of the market.
While an investor must accept all normal market rises, which include the pos-
sibility that the market misinterpreted data, he need not accept abnormal risks
like schemes to defraud the market. Shores reasoned that plaintiffs injury was
caused by such a scheme; had there been full and accurate disclosure the
bonds would have been rejected by the marketplace. The presence of a fraudu-
lent scheme, however, should not require a private damages claim for all open
market investors.
InArthur Young & Co. v. United States District Court,t27 a case involving
offerings of stock registered under the Securities Act, it was argued that the
investor's right to rely on the market price was based on his right to rely on the
federal regulatory process to ensure the accuracy of disclosure. 128 Following
this rationale, it can be asserted that open market investors have a similar right
to rely on the accuracy of information disclosed in reports filed under the Ex-
change Act. Such reliance on the regulatory process is misplaced. Even
though the SEC has made strides toward improving the quality of disclosure,
particularly in the Exchange Act reports, neither the agency nor the market-
place can ensure the accuracy of these documents. 129
These "right to rely" arguments are not persuasive substitutes for the reli-
ance requirement. They are much more persuasive arguments when they are
used to establish causation. The shareholder's complaint is that he was in-
jured by manipulation of the stocik price by means of misstatements, and that
he was harmed by the market's reaction to the misstatements; that is, that he
traded in the stock at a time when the price was tainted by inaccurate informa-
tion. Thus, the misstatements caused the injury. Since the essence of his claim
is manipulation of the stock price, reliance is irrelevent; rather, causation is the
requisite element. 130 This argument, however, potentially transforms every
Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976), or SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975), attest to the ability of the marketplace
to be misled. See Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed
Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 1471, 1482 (1979).
127. 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
128. Id. at 695.
129. So, for example, offerors of stock under a Securities Act prospectus are required to state,
in bold face capital type on the cover page, that the SEC has not passed upon the accuracy or
adequacy of the prospectus. Item 501(c)(5), form S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.501(c)(5) (1983). While
improving the quality of the 1934 Act disclosures was a prerequisite for the adoption of the inte-
grated disclosure system, see infra note 217, the SEC cannot systematically review the contents of
most filed documents due to the large number of filings under both the Securities and Exchange
Acts. See. Act Rel. No. 6190, 45 Fed. Reg. 13,438 (Feb. 29, 1980). See supra note 4.
130. This argument is strongest in cases like Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d
374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975), discussed supra notes 56-62 and accompany-
ing text, in which the plaintiff, a minority shareholder in a freeze-out merger, had no choice but to
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misstatement case into a stock manipulation case.
At common law, stock manipulation was an offense grounded on a "free
and open market" theory: the public has a right to expect that the markets are
free and open and reflect prices arrived at through bona fide transactions and
not through manipulation. 131 In Rex v. De Berenger,132 the earliest English
stock manipulation case, defendants were convicted of conspiring to raise the
price of government securities by circulating false rumors that Napoleon had
been killed and peace was forthcoming. In such cases, in which the manipula-
tion is effected through false statements, the offense resembles deceit. When,
however, the manipulation is accomplished through acts such as wash sales,
matched orders or fictitious bids, the wrong is better grounded on a "free mar-
ket" theory. Thus, stock manipulation has roots in both deceit and "free and
open market" theories. 133
The conflict between the theories is apparent in cases that consider
whether a victim of stock manipulation can sue the manipulator in the absence
of a contractual or fiduciary relationship. An early English case held that a
plaintiff who knew the listing requirements of an exchange, and purchased
stock assuming that the corporation had met those standards, could recover on
a deceit theory from defendants, who obtained the listing on the basis of false
statements made to the exchange.' 34 Later cases, both in England and the
United States, generally found that plaintiffs could not recover when there was
no fiduciary or contractual relationship, since under the deceit theory there
was either a lack of reliance or the injury was found to be too remote.135
If, instead of deceit principles, the "free market" theory is applied, it can
be argued that plaintiff has the right to expect that the prevailing market price
has been set by actual, and not rigged, transactions. When the manipulative
device is, for example, fictitious quotations, plaintiffs injury is clear, and there
is no need for reliance. Professor Berle extended this theory to assert that
when a misstatement created a false valuation by the entire market and the
buyer relied on the state of the market, he should be able to recover damages.
This must be one of the earliest expressions of a fraud on the market theory.136
relinquish his shares, and therefore reliance became meaningless. In fraud on the market cases,
however, plaintiffs do have a choice: not trading in the particular security. Cf. Madison Consul-
tants v. FDIC, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,239, at 96,041 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1983) (presumption of reliance amounts to presumption of causation where the plaintiff di-
rectly trades in stock in reliance on defendant's deception, since he could have declined to enter
the transaction if he knew of fraud).
131. Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 67, 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B. 1814).
132. Id.
133. For discussion of the development of stock manipulation in England and the United
States, see 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1529-40; Berle, Liabilityfor Stock Market Man4pulation, 31
COLUM. L. Rav. 264 (1931); Berle, Stock Market Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 393 (1938);
Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 46 (1934);
Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets Under the Securities Laws, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 651 (1951);
Note, Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YALE L.J. 509 (1947).
134. Bedford v. Bagshaw, 4 H. & N. 538, 157 Eng. Rep. 951 (1859). The decision in Bedford
was overruled by Peek v. Gurney, L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873).
135. 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1534; Moore & Wiseman, supra note 133, at 65.
136. Berle, supra note 133, at 269. See also Moore & Wiseman, supra note 133, at 65.
[Vol. 62
HeinOnline -- 62 N.C. L. Rev 456 1983-1984
FRA4 UD ON THE MARKET
When the misstatements are accompanied by other manipulative devices
and are clearly made with a manipulative intent, allowing the purchaser to
recover without showing reliance, on a "free and open market" theory, is ap-
propriate.1 37 In the absence of classic manipulative devices, allowing a pur-
chaser to recover, based on a finding of causation alone, marks a radical
departure from rule lOb-5's traditional underpinnings in deceit law. Thus,
while seemingly attractive as a principle of law and logic, such a judicial mod-
ification of rule lOb-5 is inadvisable without some sort of legislative
authority.138
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY
The principal objections to the fraud on the market theory are that it
contradicts the disclosure rationale of federal securities regulation, increases
the likelihood of complex litigation of questionable utility, and makes the po-
tential damages claims exorbitant. Recovery is no longer compensatory;
rather, it becomes a windfall. In addition, the heavy cost of litigation is borne
by the corporation and necessarily affects adversely the corporation's eco-
nomic well being, while diminishing the value of shareholders' investments.
A. The Conflict Between Federal Disclosure Policy and the Fraud on the
Market Theory
Since the principal purpose of the federal securities legislation is to pro-
vide disclosure to enable investors to make informed decisions, opponents of
the fraud on the market theory argue that this policy is undermined by permit-
ting recovery by investors who have not read the disclosure documents. 139
They contend that an investor who fails to read at least some of the readily
available public information acts recklessly and consequently should be dis-
qualified from receiving the acts' protections. 140
137. See Second Circuit stock manipulation cases supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
Some opinions have emphasized the need for a comprehensive scheme to defraud or manipulate
the stock price, and not merely material misstatements, to establish a fraud on the market claim.
Eg., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905-08 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976);
Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.
1975); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 785-86 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Green-
span v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec.
Litig., 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1314 (C.D. Cal. 1977). These courts are struggling to establish a special
category of fraud on the market cases to separate these cases from run of the mill misrepresenta-
tion cases in which plaintiffs must establish reliance. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text. They have not made clear, however, how plaintiff is to establish such a scheme. The nature
of the misstatement, the number of occasions the misstatement or a variation of it is repeated, and
the length of time over which the misstatements are made, seem to be relevent factors.
138. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982) (rule lob-5
stock manipulation claim inappropriate when an explicit remedy under § 9(e) of the Exchange
Act is available), vacated and remandedfor consideration in light of Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 1245
(1983), rev'd on remand, 718 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit determined that Huddle-
ston's "broad and unrestrictive analysis" compelled reversal of the earlier decision. For doubts on
that view see infra notes 196-211. See also infra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
139. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Randall, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983).
140. Plaintiff may be denied recovery, notwithstanding defendant's rule lob-5 violation, if
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Rebutting this objection, critics of the federal disclosure system assert that
there is no rational reason for a reasonable investor to read the disclosure
documents. They argue that the required disclosure does not provide informa-
tion useful to investment decisionmaking.' 4' The disclosure documents have
become so complex and technical that an investor untrained in accounting and
financial analysis would understand little of the contents. 142 Finally, accord-
ing to efficient-market theorists, the average investor cannot learn from the
disclosure documents anything that would enable him to outperform the mar-
ket, since the information contained therein has already been absorbed by the
market and is reflected in the stock price.143 Acceptance of any of these argu-
ments leads to the conclusion that requiring the investor to read the document
to prosecute the claim is requiring him to engage in an unproductive task; 44
therefore, an investor cannot be acting recklessly if he disregards the disclo-
sure documents. It follows that those who doubt the benefits of the current
disclosure system will more readily adopt a fraud on the market theory.
Resolution of the role of disclosure in investment decisions is outside the
scope of this Article; nevertheless the perceived conflict between the disclosure
policy and the fraud on the market theory is considerably reduced if the con-
cept of reliance is expanded to include forms other than just "eyeball" reliance
on the document itself.145 Few investors actually read and understand the
disclosure documents, but this does not mean that they do not "rely" on them
in making their investment decisions. Their reliance is simply not a direct
reliance. Instead, investors typically rely on their brokers or other advisers, or
on newspaper columns and other sources that do derive their information and
recommendations from the disclosure documents. As early as 1933, Congress
recognized this filtering-down process when it created a remedy for misstate-
ments in a registration statement in the Securities Act. 146 It is therefore appro-
priate, if not essential, for courts to recognize explicitly the existence of such
forms of indirect reliance, and to acknowledge them as appropriate methods
for investors to make their investment decisions. 147
Requiring an investor to testify about a vaguely recalled newspaper arti-
cle or conversation with his broker may well be a waste ofjudicial time. When
plaintiff failed to use "due diligence" in making his investment decision. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551
F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
141. E.g., Kripke, The Myth ofthe.Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 631 (1973).
142. 1 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORP. DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, 95th CONO.,
1st SEss., 314 (Comm. Print 1977).
143. E.g., H. KRIPKF-, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 86-87 (1979);seesupra notes 7-
8.
144. Disclosure has also been criticized on the ground that its costs outweigh its benefits. See,
e.g., Benston, supra note 126.
145. Cf. Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 438 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("eyeball"
reliance is required under § 18 of the Exchange Act).
146. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (n.s.) 508, 523-24 (1933).
147. See 1 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY CoMM.,supra note 142, at D-9, 273, 290, 312-13; Report
of the Disclosure Policy Study, Disclosure to Investors, 52, 319f (CCH 1969) ("the Wheat Report")
(recommending an SEC rule requiring broker-dealers to read the reports before making recom-
mendations to customers).
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the stock is so widely traded that information about the corporation is widely
disseminated, it may be appropriate to presume indirect reliance.148
B. Facilitating the Use of Securities Fraud Class Actions
The fraud on the market theory developed largely for pragmatic reasons.
Since class actions provide the only effective remedy for open market inves-
tors, individual, subjective issues of proof must be minimized to enable use of
the class action procedure. Thus, judicial inclination to remove obstacles from
large-scale securities fraud litigation supplied the impetus to modify the tradi-
tional reliance requirement.' 49 Consequently, plaintiffs and their attorneys
are encouraged to institute these suits and have a basis for negotiating a
favorable settlement.' 50
Whether encouraging class action suits in this manner is an appropriate
policy15 depends on one's assessment of the benefits of private securities
fraud actions. For years courts and commentators enthusiastically embraced
the premise of.J.L Case Co. v. Borak,152 that private litigation aids in effective
enforcement of the securities laws because private plaintiffs will prosecute vio-
lations that would go undetected due to the SEC's limited resources. Accord-
ingly, many courts, supported by commentators, 153 have viewed the scope of
rule lOb-5 expansively and eased plaintiff's burdens in prosecuting claims.' 54
The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that rule I Ob-5 is not the
148. Proponents of a fraud on the market theory often assert that plaintiffs need not prove
reliance in nondisclosure cases and, by extension, should not be required to prove reliance in cases
involving open market transactions because it is "impossible" to do so, and therefore such "impos-
sibility" justifies dispensing with it. E.g., Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d
88, 93 (2d Cir. 1981); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1975); Seiffer v.
Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 666 (D. Kan. 1980). It certainly is not impossible for plaintiff
to testify that if he had been told the omitted fact he would have acted differently, and such
testimony, if credible, would establish the requisite reliance. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d
457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). Courts may decide that since such testimony
is self-serving and predictable, it can be dispensed with; dispensing with the testimony, however,
does not necessitate elimination of the element of reliance in any fraud case. Rather, the need to
establish direct reliance should be balanced against the waste of judicial time, according to the
particular case.
149. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
150. Even though, under the prevailing view of Blackie, defendants may raise a plaintiff's
nonreliance defensively, see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text, plaintiffs have in most
instances won the war by obtaining class action certification, since this will virtually guarantee
their prospects of a favorable settlement.
151. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not intended to expand substantive law. 28
U.S.C. § 2872 (1976).
152. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Borak the Court implied a private cause of action under § 14(a)
of the Exchange Act, and provided the impetus for further suits to achieve the same end.
153. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Erafor Rule 10b-5, 54
VA. L. Rev. 268 (1968).
154. Thus, for instance, in some circuits, prior to Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), negligence was sufficient to establish defendant's liability. E.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d
724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying a "flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (holding negligence was sufficient to establish
liability). Also, prior to Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), plaintiff
need not have been a purchaser or seller to have standing. E.g., Eason v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp., 490 F.2d 654, 661 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
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broad, catch-all remedy some courts thought it to be.155 A principal concern
of the Court was the particularly vexatious nature of rule 1Ob-5 litigation that
gave even the flimsiest case a substantial settlement value.15 6 Respected com-
mentators have observed that since the goals of SEC and private enforcement
differ, the latter may not be an appropriate supplement to the former, but may
actually hamper the purposes of the securities laws.' 57 Moreover, evidence
that a sizeable number of private suits follow upon conclusion of SEC investi-
gations casts substantial doubt on the Borak premise. 58 These plaintiffs do
not ferret out previously undiscovered violations, but rather ride on the
agency's coattails. 159
Even if private suits are based on violations prosecuted by the SEC, it can
be argued that they provide a deterrent because of the in terrorem effect of
imposing substantial liability. This argument neglects to consider that since
ultimately the current or future shareholders "foot the bill" for plaintiffs' liti-
gation, in the form of a reduced market value for their stock, compensating the
plaintiffs for past injuries inevitably causes shareholders present or future
harm. Moreover, in a fraud on the market case, a corporation held liable for
the artificial inflation in the stock value must compensate plaintiffs even
though the premium did not directly benefit the corporation. There is no prin-
ciple of equitable disgorgement of profits, as exists in the insider trading cases,
to justify plaintiffs' recovery at the expense of other shareholders in a fraud on
the market case. 160 In addition, the concern that large awards in fraud on the
market cases become windfalls rather than compensatory recoveries is com-
pounded by the difficulties in formulating damages and in excluding any loss
due to factors unrelated to the misstatements. There can be little doubt that,
in fraud on the market cases, computation of damages can be an incredibly
complex process, with no greater assurance of reasonable accuracy. 161 This,
coupled with the fact that virtually all these cases are settled before a determi-
nation of liability, lends support to the argument that securities fraud litiga-
tions result in haphazard, arbitrary, and potentially ruinous recoveries.
Early decisions recognized a reliance requirement in rule lOb-5 cases, not
only to conform the remedy to the common-law tort, but also to limit defend-
155. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter requirement extends to injunctive
actions); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (when the misconduct involves nondisclo-
sure, defendant must have duty to disclose to be liable under rule lOb-5); Sante Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (plaintiff mnst allege a deception or misrepresentation to establish rule
lOb-5 claim); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (defendant must have acted with
scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (plaintiff must be pur-
chaser or seller to have standing in lOb-5 claim). Two issues that remain open are: recklessness as
establishing scienter, see supra note 2, and aider and abetter liability. Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 685 n.4 (1983).
156. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739-40 (1975).
157. See, e.g., Frankel, Implied Rights ofAction, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 570 (1981).
158. See Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1980).
159. See Frankel, supra note 157, at 579.
160. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); SEC v. Randolph, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,170 (N.D. Calif. 1983).
161. See supra note 30.
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ants' potential liability.162 It is ironic that the first recognition of the danger of
providing "investors' insurance" against bad investments was in cases involv-
ing negotiated transactions 163 and that the reliance requirement is most rigor-
ously adhered to today in these cases. 164 In the open market cases, however,
in which commentators have recognized the serious problem of staggering cor-
porate liability,165 many courts have largely dispensed with a reliance require-
ment in the name of protecting the open market investor.
The insider trading cases have presented most dramatically the specter of
"Draconian liability."' 66 It was the inability to limit the damage recovery that
led the Sixth Circuit, in Fridrich v. Bradford,167 to find that defendants caused
no injury to plaintiffs.' 68 In Elkind v. Ligget & Meyers, Inc. 169 the Second
Circuit attempted to solve the problem, not by refusing to find liability, but by
limiting plaintiffs' recovery to the disgorgement of defendants' gains. 170 The
First Circuit, in SEC v. MacDonald,171 went further, and held that the meas-
ure of disgorgement was limited to accretions in stock value occurring up to a
reasonable time after other investors received the information. Significantly,
the court felt it necessary to exclude gains not causally related to the fraud
even when the SEC brought the suit. These cases illustrate the judicial percep-
tion that "Draconian liability" is a serious issue when the traditional tort-law
elements are relaxed.
In conclusion, while the fraud on the market theory presents an attractive
approach to providing protection for open market investors, it nonetheless
raises serious doubts about whether it is an appropriate judicial expansion of
rule lOb-5 law. In cases in which indirect reliance cannot appropriately be
presumed, the theory conflicts with federal disclosure policy; even in cases in-
volving widely-traded securities, in which a presumption of indirect reliance is
appropriate, the theory adds to the existing difficulties plaguing the typical
large-scale federal securities litigation involving huge damages claims.
162. Eg., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
163. Eg., id; Koher v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
164. Courts are more likely to retain the requirement of reliance in some form in a privately
negotiated transaction, because of the resemblance to the common law tort of deceit. Dooley, The
Elfects of Civil Liability on Investment Banking and the New Issues Market, 58 VA. L. Rav. 776,
819 n.203 (1972). Other early commentators posited reliance as a requirement for negotiated
transactions, but not for open market transactions. Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability
under Rule lOb-, 1972 DuKr L.J. 1125, 1151.
165. See, e.g., Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: .4 Critique & an Evaluation of its Impact upon
the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1977); Dooley, supra note 164;
Frankel, supra note 157.
166. Eg., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 242 (2d Cir.
1974).
167. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
168. Id at 320-21. The Sixth Circuit did, however, leave open the question of liability when
defendants' trading affected the market price. Id at 320 n.27.
169. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
170. Id at 173.
171. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
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IV. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY AND THE EXPLICIT REMEDIES
Another objection to the fraud on the market theory is that it conflicts
with the Supreme Court's efforts to harmonize the implied remedy under rule
lOb-5 with the explicit remedies under the federal securities laws. Specifically,
rule lOb-5, with its elimination or relaxation of the reliance element, conflicts
with section 18 of the Exchange Act, which requires direct reliance.
In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston 172 the Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff's potential section 11 claim173 under the Securities Act did not pre-
clude recovery under rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act. While recognizing the
overlap of section 11 and rule 1Ob-5 and, in general, the appropriateness of
cumulative remedies, the Court's opinion does not mandate cumulative reme-
dies in all instances.174 Instead, the implied remedy must be harmonized with
the explicit remedies. 175 In addition, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'76 the
Supreme Court declined to extend rule lOb-5 liability to negligent misstate-
ments because it would "nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn proce-
dural restrictions"' 177 of section 11. Therefore, the role of reliance and
causation in the explicit remedy provisions must be examined in order to de-
termine their appropriate role in rule lOb-5 claims, since the Court would re-
fuse to dispense with a reliance requirement in rule lOb-5 if it conflicted with
the congressionally designed statutory scheme.' 78
Section 11 of the Securities Act 179 permits anyone who acquires a security
issued under a registration statement to sue the issuer and certain other speci-
fied defendants for material misstatements in the registration statement.
There is no requirement that plaintiff demonstrate any reliance on the registra-
tion statement unless he acquires the security after the issuer releases an earn-
ings statement covering a twelve-month period beginning after the effective
172. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
173. The court of appeals noted that plaintiffs "apparently did have a Section 11 remedy,"
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 640 F.2d 534, 541 n.5 (1981), although the Supreme Court
indicated that this conclusion may be open with respect to the accounting firm, 103 S. Ct. at 687
n. 11. A commentator has suggested that the § 11 claim was apparently time-barred. Siegal, The
Interplay Between the Implied Remedy under Section 10(b) and the Express Causes ofAction of the
Federal Securities Laws, 62 B.U.L. REv. 385, 391 (1982).
174. In Huddleston cumulative remedies under § 11 and rule lOb-5 were accepted because
"the two provisions involve distinct causes of action and were intended to address different types
of wrongdoing." 103 S. Ct. at 687. Section 11 was "designed to assure compliance with the
disclosure provisions of the Act by imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who
play a direct role in a registered offering," id, and thus imposes liability for any material misstate-
ment in the registration statement. Rule 10b-5, on the other hand, is a "catchall" antifraud provi-
sion requiring scienter. Id
175. In Huddleston the Court determined that exempting fraudulent misstatements in registra-
tion statements from rule lOb-5 liability would "conflict with the basic purpose of the 1933 Act: to
provide greater protection to purchasers of registered securities." Id at 688.
176. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
177. Id at 210.
178. A threshold question is whether there is, in fact, a coherent statutory scheme with respect
to the explicit remedies, since a significant distinction between the two Acts is apparent. The
remedies for material misstatements under the Securities Act substantially ease plaintiffs burden
of proving causation and reliance; the remedy for material misstatements under the Exchange Act
requires plaintiff to prove both reliance and causation.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
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date of the registration statement.180 Even when reliance is required, it may
be established by means other than showing that the plaintiff actually read the
document.' 8 Moreover, plaintiff need not prove that the price of the stock
was artificially inflated by reason of the misstatement; 182 rather, it is defend-
ant's burden to show that the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff resulted
from factors other than the misstatement. 183
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act I84 permits a purchaser of a security to
sue the offeror or seller for misstatements made either orally or in a prospec-
tus.185 There is no requirement that the plaintiff establish reliance or that the
misstatement cause his injury.'8 6
In contrast, section 18 of the Exchange Act permits a purchaser or seller
of a security to sue for misstatements contained in reports filed under the Ex-
change Act, but only when he can show that he relied directly on the statement
and that the stock price was affected by the statement.' 87 Thus, the plaintiff
must show both reliance and causation to establish a section 18 violation.
Finally, section 9(e) of the Exchange Act provides that an investor who
trades in a security registered on a national securities exchange, at a price af-
fected by certain forms of stock manipulation, may sue for damages anyone
who willfully participates in the proscribed act.188 There is no requirement of
reliance, but plaintiffs burden of establishing causation is onerous. It has
been described as "double-barreled"; he must show that he bought or sold at a
price affected by the manipulation, and his recovery is limited to damages
sustained as a result of the manipulation.' 89
In enacting the Securities Act, Congress recognized that many investors
would not be able to understand much of the contents of the registration state-
ment and would necessarily rely on other sources of information. The infor-
mation in the registration statement would affect most investors by its effect on
180. Id § 77k(a).
181. Id
182. Plaintiffs who sue under § 11 (a) may recover the difference between the amount paid for
the security (not to exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public) and (I) the
value of the security on the date the suit was brought, or (2) the price at which the security was
sold, if sold before the suit, or (3) the price at which the security was sold, if sold before judgment,
if greater than the value on the date suit was brought. An underwriter is not liable for damages in
excess of the total offering price of the securities underwritten by it. In no event shall the amount
recoverable exceed the total offering price. Id § 77k(e).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976). For application of this "negative causation" defense, see Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
185. Unlike § 11, § 12(2) liability extends to the sale of unregistered securities. Section 12(2),
however, requires privity between plaintiff and defendant, and thus is not designed as a remedy
for fraud on the market. But see Croy v. Campbell, 624 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980) (seller liability
extends beyond strict privity; test of proximate cause used).
186. Section 12(2) provides plaintiff shall recover the price paid upon tender of the security or
for damages if he no longer owns the security. Presumably this would be measured by the
purchase price of the stock less the proceeds of the sale, with no allowance for the "negative
causation" defense authorized in § I 1(e).
187. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
188. Id at § 78i(e).
189. 3 L. Loss, supra note 2, at 1750-51.
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the stock price.190 Therefore, Congress determined that generally purchasers
of the securities need not establish reliance on the registration statement and
need never demonstrate that they had read the registration statement.
Since Congress in 1933 clearly understood the average investor's depen-
dence on professional sources for making investment decisions, one looks to
determine the reasons Congress, in 1934, required plaintiffs to establish both
reliance and causation to state a claim under section 18 of the Exchange Act.
Legislative history provides a clear answer. As originally drafted, the provi-
sion did not contain a requirement of reliance; opposition to the Exchange
Act, led principally by the stock exchanges, resulted in the provision's revision
to its current form. 191
190. Thus, William 0. Douglas noted that:
[E]ven though an investor has neither the time, money, nor intelligence to assimilate the
mass of information in the registration statement, there will be those who can and who
will do so, whenever there is a broad market. The judgment of those experts will be
reflected in the price market. Through them investors who seek advice will be able to
obtain it. And so during the early months of the life of a security the registration state-
ment will serve as a healthy conditioner of the market .... The common law with its
insistence upon the presence of an intent on the part of the seller to defraud, of a causal
relation between the misstatement and the damage, and of a reliance by the buyer on the
misstatement, presented almost insuperable procedural barriers to recovery.
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE Rv. (n.s.) 521, 524 (1933).
See also Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 176 (1933)
(During the early life of a security "the registration statement will be an important conditioner of
the market." If plaintiff buys in the open market "he may be as much affected by misstatements as
if he had read and understood the statement.").
191. Identical bills, which led eventually to the final legislation, were introduced by Senator
Fletcher on February 9, 1934, S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and by Representative Rayburn
on February 10, 1934, H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). What was then § 17(a) read as
follows:
Any person who shall make or any person, including any director, officer, accountant, or
other agent of such person, who shall be responsible for the making of any statement in
any application, report, or document filed with the Commission, which statement is, in
the light of the circumstances under which it was made, false or misleading in respect of
any matter sufficiently important to influence the judgment of an average investor shall
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who
shall have purchased or sold a security the price of which may have been affected by
such statement, and the person injured may sue in law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction for the damages caused by such statement, unless the person sued
shall sustain the burden of proof that he acted in good faith and in the exercise of reason-
able care had no ground to believe that such statement was false or misleading.
During the hearings on the bills, representatives of the stock exchanges, in particular, voiced
strong objections to § 17 on several grounds, one of which was the absence of a requirement of
reliance. This was part of the stock exchanges' campaign against imposition of reporting require-
ments on listed corporations. Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange,
stated that:
[Tihe really objectionable feature of this provision is that the civil penalties may be re-
covered by persons who have not relied upon the inaccurate or misleading state-
ment .... If any civil penalties are deemed necessary, then they should be limited to
the actual damages suffered by persons who have been misled by the false or inaccurate
statement.
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Cong.), S Res. 56 & S. Res. 57 Before the
Senate Banking Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6638 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Practices Hearings];
see also Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.A 7852 & H..A 8720 Before the House Inter-
state & Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 226 (1934) (statement of Richard Whitney,
Pres. of the N.Y.S.E. [hereinafter cited as Regulation Hearings]; Practices Hearings, supra, Comm.
Exhibit No. I 11, at 7285 (statement of Richard Whitney on § 17). Others asserted that the provi-
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In light of its background, section 18 appears to be a classic product of
political compromise. Realizing that all traders would be injured by a mis-
statement,192 Congress, to assure passage of the legislation, nevertheless gave
only a small segment of investors a remedy.
The closest analogue in the explicit remedies to rule lOb-5's implied rem-
edy of fraud on the market is section 18,193 which requires direct reliance 194
on filed documents. 195 The presence of this requirement in section 18 raises
serious questions about allowing less than direct reliance as a basis for the
sion would encourage "blackmail," Practices Hearings supra, at 6939 (statement of Mr. Bernheim,
Dir., Securities Markets Survey of the Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.); id at 6993 (statement of
Mr. Thompson, Pres., Ass'n of Stock Exchanges); Regulation Hearings, supra, at 262 (statement of
Mr. Thompson), would serve to protect speculators from their bad investments, Practices Hear-
ings, supra, at 6914-15 (statement of Mr. Hope, Pres., Ass'n of Stock Exchange Firms); Regulation
Hearings, supra, at 307 (statement by Mr. Hope), and was a "hold-up," Practices Hearings, supra,
at 7267 (statement of Mr. Blumenthal, Chairman, Sidney Blumenthal & Co., Inc.).
The bills were revised prior to debate in the House and Senate. The revised versions of the
Senate and House bills varied somewhat in language. See H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess., 78 CONG. REc. 9323 (1934) (§ 17(a)); and S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG.
REc. 3420 (1934) (§ 18(a)). Both, however, now stated that liability runs to any person not know-
ing that such statement was false or misleading who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have
purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused
by such reliance. In House debate, Representative Rayburn explained that the change had been
made in response to the expressed opposition.
The first provision of the bill as originally written was very much challenged on the
ground that reliance should be required. This objection has been met. In other words, if
a man bought a security following a prospectus that carried a false or misleading state-
ment, he could not recover from the man who sold to him, nor could the seller be pun-
ished criminally, unless the buyer bought the security with knowledge of the statement
and relied upon the statement. It seemed to us that this is as little as we could do.
78 CoNG. REC. 7700-01 (1934) (emphasis added); see also Rayburn's response to Hollister's objec-
tions to § 17(a), id at 8039 (1934). At another point, Rayburn noted that the civil liability provi-
sions in the Securities Act went further than this provision. See id at 8040 (1934); see also S. Doc.
No. 185, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 10,186 (1934).
While differences between the Senate and the House versions remained to be ironed out in
conference, the language regarding reliance was not changed. H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 36 (1934) (Conference Report to accompany H.R. 9323).
192. For reactions of commentators at the time of its passage, see Tracey & MacChesney, The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REv. 1025, 1058 (1934); Comment, CivilLiabilityfor
Misstatements in Documents Filed Under Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J.
456, 461 (1935). For a later critical view of § 18, see Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of/Disclo-
sure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 627 (1964).
193. Section 9(e) provides a private remedy for certain forms of stock manipulation, ie., will-
ful participation in an act or transaction prohibited under subsections (a), (b) or (c) of§ 9. Section
9(a)(4) could give rise to a fraud on the market claim, since the gravamen is making misstatements
for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of the security. The defendant, however, must be
a person selling, offering to sell, purchasing or offering to purchase said security, so if the corpora-
tion were not in the market, the section would not be applicable. When applicable, there would be
issues concerning what is required to establish the requisite purpose.
194. Moreover, courts have interpreted the reliance requirement in § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(1976), strictly as "eyeball" reliance on the document. Eg., Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,267 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1981); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
195. Section 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976), provides liability for material misstatements contained
in any document filed pursuant to the Securities or Exchange Acts, or the rules and regulations
thereunder. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976), requires the filing of certain documents, e.g., the
reports on forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K, for issuers of securities registered under § 12. In general,
annual reports to shareholders are not deemed to be "filed" with the SEC and are therefore not
subject to the liabilities of § 18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1983).
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implied remedy. In Huddleston 196 the Supreme Court accepted the cumula-
tive remedies of section 11 and rule lOb-5, because it found that "the two
provisions involve distinct causes of action and were intended to address dif-
ferent types of wrongdoing."' 19 7 When the rule lOb-5 remedy closely resem-
bles the express remedy in section 18 and addresses the same type of
wrongdoing, Huddleston's justification for cumulative remedies fails. Even so,
permitting cumulative remedies works no harm if it means mere duplication.
If the implied remedy relaxes a requirement of the explicit remedy, however,
an unacceptable nullification of the congressional scheme results. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder198 sought to avoid nullification of sec-
tion 11 and its procedural restrictions by interpreting rule lOb-5 to require
scienter. Following the same reasoning, it would be inappropriate to imply a
remedy under rule lOb-5 that expanded an express remedy, by eliminating an
element required to make out the express claim. To permit this would nullify
the express remedy and allow improper judicial intervention in the statutory
scheme.
The forerunner of the cumulative remedies approach is the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co. ,199 which the Su-
preme Court cited with approval in Huddleston.2°° Both preferred and
common stockholders brought suit alleging misstatements in a registration
statement filed under the Securities Act with respect to the preferred stock.
While only the preferred stockholders had a remedy under section II of the
Securities Act, the court held that the common stockholders could bring a rule
lOb-5 claim. It reasoned that plaintiffs who met the requirements for suing
under section 11201 established a prima facie case by showing that the docu-
ment contained material misstatements. To avoid liability, the individual de-
fendants must prove that they exercised due diligence. 20 2 Plaintiffs who did
not satisfy the requirements of section 11 must establish not only the material
misstatements, but also the defendant's fraudulent intent.203 Thus, the court
reasoned, rule lOb-5 is available for "all who are the victims of the fraud" 2°4
whether or not they could bring suit under section 11. Courts subsequently
extended Fischman's rationale to allow rule lOb-5 claims to be brought not
only by plaintiffs who never could have sued under section 11, but also by
plaintiffs who theoretically might have had a section I 1 claim, but had not
196. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
197. Id at 687.
198. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
199. 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
200. 103 S. Ct. 683, 689 (1983).
201. Plaintiff must be a purchaser of the securities issued under the registration statement; he
must bring suit within the statute of limitations prescribed under § 13 (generally of shorter dura-
tion than the state's fraud statutes of limitations applicable under rule 1Ob-5); and the court may
require him to post security for costs, § 11 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
202. Section 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976).
203. The Second Circuit in Fischman correctly anticipated the holding of Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
204. Firchman, 188 F.2d at 786.
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brought it.20 5 Huddleston confirmed this cumulative remedies approach.
The Second Circuit, in Ross v. A.H. Robins Co. ,206 applied Fischman's
logic and held that a rule lOb-5 claim could be based on misstatements con-
tained in a document filed under the Exchange Act, notwithstanding the sec-
tion 18 remedy. It noted "substantial differences in the burden facing the
plaintiff under the two statutes. ' 20 7 Under rule 1Ob-5, the plaintiff must prove
scienter, while under section 18 the defendant must prove he acted in good
faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false and misleading. On
the other hand, section 18 required direct, "eyeball" reliance on the document,
while rule lOb-5, according to the court, permitted indirect reliance. In the
view of the court, the higher standard of proof imposed on the plaintiff under
rule 1Ob-5 provided the rationale both for justifying the availability of the rule
lOb-5 remedy, notwithstanding the existence of section 18, and for relaxing
section 18's direct reliance requirement under rule lOb-5. 208
The analysis in Robins is suspect, given the rationale of Huddleston.209
An examination of section 18(a) and rule lOb-5 leads to the conclusion that the
provisions do not "address different types of wrongdoing. '2 10 Rather, they
both are concerned with fraudulent misstatements, regardless of the shift in
the burden of proof. Moreover, in earlier opinions, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that section 18 was the exclusive remedy for misstatements in filed
documents. 2 11
On the other hand, the broad language of Huddleston and its emphasis
that rule lOb-5 fraud is light-years away from the common-law deceit rem-
edy,212 indicate that the Court will not be inhibited by the explicit remedies in
fashioning the reliance and causation elements under rule lOb-5. In addition,
205. See also Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981), in which the District of Columbia Circuit,
relying upon Fischman, held that purchasers of stock in a private placement were not limited to a
remedy under § 12(2) of the Securities Act, but could bring a rule lOb-5 claim. See also Berger v.
Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1982); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); In re
New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 507 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
206. 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
207. I d at 555.
208. Id at 556. A.H. Robins Co. is criticized in Siegel, supra note 173. In contrast to A.H.
Robins Co., in Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated
and remandedfor consideration in light of Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 1254 (1983), rev'don remand, 718
F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983), this nullification approach was held to bar an implied remedy under rule
lOb-5 when a claim was not made out under § 9(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
The Chemetron court reasoned that since § 9(a)(4)'s scienter, causation, and reliance requirements
are more stringent than those of rule lOb-5, allowing the implied remedy would nullify the express
remedy. Chemetron, 682 F.2d at 1162. On remand, however, the court concluded that, after Hud-
dleston, a claim that contained all the elements of a rule lob-5 offense should not be barred
because of an express statutory remedy.
209. 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
210. Id at 687.
211. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
212. 103 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1983) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 744-45 (1975)).
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Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co. is cited in Huddleson,21 3 although in the context it
would be straining to read its citation as necessarily approving the result.
Liability is imposed under section 18 only with respect to misstatements
in filed documents, 21 4 and, notwithstanding Robins, section 18 is best viewed
as the exclusive remedy. Most misstatements found in filed documents, how-
ever, are also contained in unfiled documents. Accordingly, the question be-
comes whether liability for misstatements in unified documents can be
grounded under rule lOb-5 if such misstatements are also found in filed docu-
ments. The answer to this question must certainly be yes. Since SEC v. Texas
GufSul#hur,2t5 courts have imposed liability without regard to whether mis-
statements are also found in filed documents. The question then becomes,
since direct reliance is required for imposing liability for misstatements in filed
documents under section 18, must such reliance be required for imposing lia-
bility for misstatements in unfiled documents under rule lOb-5. To answer
this question negatively is not to "nullify" section 18, although its scope be-
comes very narrow. By this approach section 18 becomes a remedy of last
resort, applicable only when the misstatement was contained in no document
other than a fied one and only when the investor actually read the document.
This is not inconsistent with congressional intent.
V. INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE-THE SEC's RECOGNITION OF THE
EFFICIENT-MARKET THESIS
Proponents of the fraud on the market theory rely on the efficient-market
thesis to justify the theory's extended use in securities fraud cases. The SEC
explicitly recognized the efficient market thesis in 1982 by its adoption of an
integrated disclosure system. Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the inte-
grated disclosure system in determining the extent of the SEC's acceptance of
the efficient-market thesis to the fraud on the market theory, and its applica-
tion. When the SEC has determined that information about a corporation is
sufficiently widely disseminated that it need not be directly provided to the
purchaser in the prospectus, the courts should likewise appropriately presume
indirect reliance on the information by open market investors in fraud on the
market cases. 2 16
The integrated disclosure system marked the culmination of the SEC's
efforts to effect a major policy reversal: to deemphasize the Securities Act's
disclosure system which mandates delivery of a prospectus to the investor
213. Id at 689 n.21.
214. See supra note 195.
215. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Contra McKee v. Federal's
Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,958 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 1979) (when
allegedly fraudulent misstatements were contained in both form 10-K and the annual report, a
rule lOb-5 action could not be brought).
216. While most of the fraud on the market cases involve securities purchased in trading trans-
actions, with disclosure requirements regulated by the Exchange Act, the integrated disclosure
system prescribes prospectus disclosure requirements for securities offerings registered under the
Securities Act. Since the integrated disclosure system assumes an equivalency of materiality of
information under the two acts, this distinction should be irrelevant.
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upon the distribution of securities, and to emphasize the Exchange Act's dis-
closure system which mandates periodic filing of disclosure documents.2 17
Three levels of registrants are created. Corporations whose stocks are actively
traded and widely followed in the marketplace may use form S-3. These regis-
trants comprise the first level. 2 18 The second level of registrants, those that
have been subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act for at
least three years, may use form S-2. Finally, all other issuers must use form S-
1.
The quantity of information required in the prospectus depends on which
form the issuer is permitted to use. The SEC's creation of a "top tier" of issu-
ers that need disseminate only a bare-bones prospectus (form S-3) is based on
the efficient-market thesis. In incorporating this theory, the SEC assumes that,
in the case of the most widely traded securities, information on the issuer is
widely available,219 there is some assurance that it is accurate,220 and there-
fore it need not be directly supplied to the investor. In these instances, the
prospectus need contain only new information, or information that brings up-
to-date previously filed information, about the issuer, as well as information
relating specifically to the offering. All other information traditionally con-
tained in a prospectus is not set forth in the form S-3 prospectus, but is incor-
porated by reference to the Exchange Act documents.2 21 In contrast, an issuer
eligible to use form S-2 must either deliver to the investor copies of the rele-
vant Exchange Act reports or reprint the information in the prospectus. Form
S-1 users must prepare a detailed disclosure document.
To be eligible to use form S-3, the issuer must have been subject to the
Exchange Act reporting requirements for at least thirty-six months; it must
217. The premise of the integrated disclosure system-that the periodic disclosure require-
ments of the Exchange Act play a more significant role in the disclosure scheme than the transac-
tional disclosure requirements of the Securities Act-was first developed in Cohen, "Truth in
Securities"Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966). For background on the integrated disclosure
system, see Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6331, 46 Fed.
Reg. 41,902 (1981); Sec. Act Rel. No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980).
218. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1983).
219. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980).
220. The efficient-market theory draws no distinctions between accurate and inaccurate infor-
mation. See supra notes 7-8. The SEC views the filing of the reports with the SEC, with at least
the potential for SEC review, and the liabilities for misstatements, as a curb on both intentional
and unintentional misstatements by management. The upgrading of the quality of the Exchange
Act documents is an essential aspect of the integrated disclosure system. See generally Sec. Act
Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982).
221. The technique of incorporation by reference subjects the issuer to liability under § 11 of
the Securities Act for material misstatements in the registration statement, see supra notes 179-83
and accompanying text, even though the misstatements are contained in the Exchange Act reports
and are not reproduced in the prospectus received by the investor. Underwriters participating in a
securities offering pursuant to form S-3 thus are liable for misstatements in the Exchange Act
reports, even though they did not participate in their preparation, unless they can establish the
"due diligence" defense of § I l(b)(3). 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1982). Rule 176, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.176 (1983), identifies certain of the circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of the
investigation and the determination of what constitutes reasonable ground for belief under
§ ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1982). See also Rule 412, 17 C.F.R. § 230.412 (1983). For criti-
cism of the SEC's approach of "incorporation by reference," see Pickholz & Horahan, The SECs
Version of the Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 943 (1982).
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have filed all required reports during that period; and it must have timely filed
all reports for the past twelve months.222 There are certain disqualifying
events.223 Moreover, in the SEC's view, subjecting a stock to the continuous
disclosure requirements for three years gives no assurance that it is sufficiently
followed by the financial analysts to warrant application of the efficient-mar-
ket thesis, and thus trigger eligibility for form S-3.224 To ensure that form S-3
is available only to such widely traded securities, the SEC imposes certain
"transaction" requirements. The most significant one, in primary offerings for
cash, is a "float" requirement of $150 million or, alternatively, a float of $100
million and an annual trading volume of three million shares.225 When the
primary offering for cash is of "investment grade" 226 nonconvertible debt and
preferred securities, there is no float or trading volume requirement. In these
offerings the SEC determined that investment decisions are made principally
on the basis of interest rates and security ratings and not on the basis of spe-
cific information about the issuer.227 Moreover, any secondary offering228 of a
qualified issuer's stock may use form S-3 as long as the securities are listed on
a national securities exchange or quoted in NASDAQ, because the SEC "con-
cluded that most secondary offerings are more in the nature of ordinary mar-
ket transactions than primary offerings by the registrant, and thus, that
Exchange Act reports may be relied upon to provide the marketplace the in-
formation needed respecting the registrant." 229
Reviewing the SEC's three releases on integrated disclosure, one sees a
tightening in the criteria for form S-3 eligibility from those first proposed,
222. In addition, the issuer must be domestically organized with its principal business opera-
tions in the United States or its territories, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(a)(1) (1983), or a foreign private
issuer that files the same reports with the SEC under § 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(d) (1982), as does a domestic issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(a)(5) (1983).
223. The following acts disqualify the issuer from using form S-3: If the issuer or its subsidi-
ary, since the end of the last fiscal year for which certified financial statements have been filed,
failed to pay a dividend or sinking fund installment on preferred stock; or defaulted on any in-
stallment on indebtedness for borrowed money; or defaulted on any rental on one or more long
term leases, which defaults in the aggregate are material to the issuer's financial position. While
the SEC abandoned proposals to coordinate form S-3 eligibility to an assessment of the quality of
the issuer, it was nevertheless concerned that until release of the audited financial statements,
information about these developments might not be widely known. Therefore, it will not allow
corporations that would otherwise be eligible for form S-3 to avail themselves of the benefits
provided by recognition of the efficient-market theory.
224. Contrast the approach of the ALI's FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §§ 202 (113); 505(a)
(1980), in which a distinction is drawn between registrants that have been subject to the reporting
requirements for one year and those that have not.
225. "Float" is defined as the aggregate market value of the voting stock held by non-affiliates
of the registrant. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (1983). An "affiliate" is a person that controls, is
controlled by, or is under common control with, the registrant. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1983).
226. "Investment grade securities" are defined at 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(2) (1983); typically,
they are those rated within the four highest categories by at least two of the nationally recognized
statistical rating organizations. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(F)(1) (1983).
227. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383,47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982). Other transactions eligible for use of
form S-3 by qualified issuers are certain rights offerings or offerings related to dividend or interest
reinvestment plans, conversions, and warrants. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(4) (1983).
228. A secondary offering is one in which the seller of the securities is not the issuer. See 17
C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1), (3) (1983).
229. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982).
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which were basically those of former S-16.230 Apparently, the SEC became
convinced that the market is not so efficient as had been popularly supposed,
and that form S-16 availability included many securities not widely followed.
In addition, the SEC initially proposed that secondary offerings would be sub-
ject to the same float criteria as primary offerings. Only after many commen-
tators noted the hardships that would occur as a result, particularly for
secondary offerings previously eligible under form S-16,231 did the SEC relax
the requirements for secondary offerings.
The integrated disclosure system thus supports Blackie's232 rebuttable
presumption of indirect reliance with respect to the top tier of issuers, those
meeting the issuer eligibility requirements of form S-3 and one of the alterna-
tive float requirements. In addition, when the securities offered are investment
grade, nonconvertible senior securities, a court may apply the Blackie pre-
sumption consistent with the premise underlying the integrated disclosure
system.
It can be argued that the Blackie presumption should be extended to in-
lude all issuers that meet the registrant eligibility requirements and that have
securities listed on a national securities exchange or NASDAQ. This ap-
proach is consistent with the SEC's justification for relaxing the requirements
for secondary offerings since they are more like trading transactions. 233 The
SEC's distinction between primary and secondary offerings, however, is incon-
sistent with the underlying premise of the integrated disclosure system-that
materiality is equivalent for purposes of both Acts-and apparently was moti-
vated by pragmatic considerations. 234
If the securities involved in a fraud on the market case do not meet the
criteria of form S-3, the court should not grant plaintiffs the Backie presump-
tion of reliance. This refusal is consistent with the SEC's determination that
market information is not sufficiently widely disseminated to assume the mar-
ket's general familiarity with it. The requirement of reliance could be satis-
fied, however, in a number of ways other than eyeball reliance: discussions
with a broker or investment adviser or information from an investment col-
umn. 235 Such a showing of indirect reliance is appropriate for issuers falling
in the second tier-basically 3-year registrants with securities listed on an ex-
change or traded through NASDAQ. Corporations in this category have an
established background and are followed by financial analysts and the press.
An investor might appropriately make an investment decision by consulting
these available sources.
If the fraud on the market case involved securities of an issuer that must
230. Form S-16, 17 C.F.R. § 239.27 (1983), permitted the use of short form registration state-
ments for secondary offerings. See Sec. Act Rel. No. 5117, 36 Fed. Reg. 777 (1970).
231. Compare Sec. Act Rel. No. 6331,46 Fed. Reg. 41,902 (1981), with Sec. Act Rel. No. 6393,
47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982).
232. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
233. Sec. Act Rel. No. 6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (1982).
234. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
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use form S-i, the court should examine more closely the basis of plaintiff's
investment decision. If plaintiff traded in stock of unseasoned firms or other
speculative securities, the court should require a more direct form of reliance,
perhaps including the perusal of corporate reports, to permit recovery under
rule lOb-5. Without a showing of direct reliance, plaintiffs claim should be
dismissed because such investor acted recklessly in failing to consult available
information.236 His claim should be barred under rule lOb-5, so that the fed-
eral disclosure policy is not undermined. 237
VI. CONCLUSION
The fraud on the market theory was born out of judicial desire to provide
an effective remedy for open market investors defrauded by misstatements and
in particular to accommodate the rule lOb-5 remedy to the class action device.
Its development, moreover, was furthered by the growing acceptance of the
efficient-market theory, which calls into question the value of the average in-
vestor's direct, individual reliance on disclosure documents. Thus, fraud on
the market reworks the traditional elements of a rule lOb-5 claim-material-
ity, reliance, and causation-to reflect the realities of open-market trading.
Fraud on the market has not yet developed into a coherent theory. In all
its forms, the role of reliance is reduced by the emphasis on materiality and
causation. In its most extreme form, a finding of materiality results in the
conclusion that the violation caused the investor's injury: reliance is effec-
tively eliminated as an element. Under this pure causation approach, every
action for misstatement is transformed into a stock manipulation claim. This
pure causation form of the fraud on the market theory is persuasive when the
securities are traded in an efficient market, for if the misstatement has an im-
pact in determining the stock price, necessarily every trader in that stock is
affected by the misstatement and suffers injury as a result of it. When, on the
other hand, the securities are not so widely traded that their market can be
considered efficient, there is no basis for assuming that the information had an
impact on the price that affects all investors. Completely eliminating the re-
quirement of reliance, however, would mark a radical departure from rule
lOb-5's traditional underpinnings and should not be undertaken by the judici-
ary. Moreover, it is hard to justify a cause of action that demands stricter
proof in a negotiated transaction than in an open market transaction. It is
particularly hard to justify such a result when part of the rationale for borrow-
ing the requirements from common law is to limit liability under the rule.
Less radically, fraud on the market is analyzed, not as eliminating the
element of reliance, but as according plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption of
236. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977), is the leading
case requiring that a plaintiff in a rule lOb-5 claim establish that he used "due diligence" in mak-
ing his investment decision. Under Dupuy, plaintiff's negligence will not bar his recovery; only
reckless conduct establishes lack of due diligence. Other courts require that plaintiff demonstrate
"reasonable" reliance. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. dented,
430 U.S. 955 (1977).
237. See supra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
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reliance. A fraud on the market theory dispensing with a requirement that
investors must actually read the disclosure documents is sound in the case of
widely-traded securities. Affording plaintiff a presumption of reliance in the
case of widely-traded securities follows logically from the efficient-market the-
ory, and it is appropriate to transfer to the defendant the burden of disproving
reliance. Such a relaxed view of reliance, however, is not appropriate in cases
of less widely-traded securities, in which the information regarding the stock is
not so readily available. Here plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate
some form of reliance. In most cases, it should not be necessary to demon-
strate that the plaintiff actually read the document; reliance can take whatever
form is reasonable under the circumstances. When the securities at issue are
speculative, however, it is appropriate for the court to require plaintiff to prove
actual reliance on the disclosure documents.
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